Three Essays in Health and Education by Moghtaderi, Ali
University of Wisconsin Milwaukee
UWM Digital Commons
Theses and Dissertations
August 2014
Three Essays in Health and Education
Ali Moghtaderi
University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee
Follow this and additional works at: https://dc.uwm.edu/etd
Part of the Labor Economics Commons
This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by UWM Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Theses and Dissertations
by an authorized administrator of UWM Digital Commons. For more information, please contact open-access@uwm.edu.
Recommended Citation
Moghtaderi, Ali, "Three Essays in Health and Education" (2014). Theses and Dissertations. 566.
https://dc.uwm.edu/etd/566
  
 
THREE ESSAYS IN HEALTH AND EDUCATION 
 
by 
 
Ali Moghtaderi 
 
A Dissertation Submitted in  
Partial Fulfillment of the  
Requirements for the Degree of 
 
 
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY 
in ECONOMICS 
 
 
 
 
at 
The University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee 
August 2014  
 ii 
 
ABSTRACT 
THREE ESSAYS IN HEALT AND EDUCATION  
 
by 
 
Ali Moghtaderi 
 
The University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, 2014 
Under the Supervision of Professor Scott Adams 
 
The goal of this dissertation is to apply empirical methodologies to analyze multiple 
topics in economics of education and health economics which have clear policy 
implications. 
Chapter 1 analyzes the effect of negative publicity of child abuse scandal on 
Catholic schools. Public notices of child abuse have surrounded Catholic Church 
leadership for decades, but intensified after the 2002 coverage by the Boston Globe and 
the ensuing accelerated media coverage. Using diocese level panel data of Catholic 
school enrollment, reports of abuse after 2002 appear to have a negative, long-lasting 
effect on both demand and supply of Catholic schools.  No effect is observed from 
notices prior to 2002, suggesting the public awareness of the scandal from abuse reports, 
combined with mass media coverage, led to observable effects on Catholic School 
enrollment. Public notices of allegations related to the abuse scandal can explain about 
two-thirds of the decline in Catholic school enrollment share and the number of Catholic 
schools. 
 iii 
 
Chapter 2 studies the effect of various state level policies as well as receiving a 
physician recommendation on the decision to uptake Human Papillomavirus (HPV) 
vaccine. HPV is the most common sexually transmitted source of infection in the United 
States. Recently, two vaccines were developed to provide immunization against certain 
types of HPV.  In addition to physician recommendations to take these vaccines, different 
states have adopted a wide range of policies in order to increase the vaccination rate, 
specifically among younger females. In this study, I use survey data to examine the effect 
of the two most common adopted policies, school mandates and provision of educational 
content for parents about the virus and its immunization, as well as the effects of 
physician recommendations. The results indicate that the effect of policies on 
encouraging the HPV vaccination has been very limited at best, but the effect of 
receiving a physician’s advice for the HPV immunization is significant.  
Chapter 3 attempts to investigate the behavioral response to HPV vaccine. 
Immunization can cause moral hazard by reducing the cost of risky behaviors. In this 
study, I examine the effect of HPV vaccination on participation in Papanicolaou test (Pap 
test). The Pap test is a diagnostic screening test to detect potentially precancerous and 
cancerous process in the transformation zone. The Pap test is strongly recommended for 
women between 21-65 years old even after taking the HPV vaccine. If there is a 
reduction in willingness to have a Pap test as a result of HPV vaccination, it should be a 
concern for public health policy makers. The results show no evidence of moral hazard, 
more specifically in the short-run. The estimates range from zero to a positive effect of 
HPV vaccine initiation on having a Pap test.  
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Chapter 1: Child Abuse Scandal Publicity and Catholic School 
Enrollment 
 
1.1. Introduction  
Catholic schools play a significant role in private and religious education in the 
United States. Enrollment in Catholic schools is associated with a higher probability of 
high school graduation and college attendance, especially for urban minorities. It is also 
associated with greater labor market outcomes and reductions in risky behaviors, such as 
teenage sexual activity and drug use (Altonji et al., 2005b; Figlio & Ludwig, 2000; Kim, 
2011; Neal, 1997). On the other hand, public schools benefit from the increased 
competition that Catholic schools provide (Carattini et al., 2012; Hoxby, 1994).  
Despite the benefits derived from Catholic schooling, the percentage of all private 
school students enrolled in Catholic schools decreased from 45 percent in 1995-1996 to 
39 percent in 2009-2010. Much of this reduction is due to declining enrollment in 
parochial schools. Parochial schools are run by parishes, not by diocese or independently 
(National Center for Education Statistics, 2012). A total of 1,856 schools were reported 
closed or consolidated between 2004 and 2014. However, most inner-city and urban 
schools managed to remain open (National Catholic Educational Association, 2014) 
There are several potential explanations that describe the aforementioned decline 
in the demand for Catholic schools: demographic changes, socioeconomic changes, and 
negative publicity that arose from the child abuse scandal crisis among leadership in the 
Catholic Church. The goal of this paper is to investigate the impact the Catholic child 
abuse scandal had on the availability of Catholic schools as well as on their share from 
total enrollment. The mass media coverage of the scandal accelerated profoundly in 2002, 
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when the Boston Globe published a series of articles on the issue. Soon after, the abuse 
became engrained in the national consciousness and the volume of victims that came 
forward and made allegations against the Catholic Church accelerated.  This is certainly 
one of the largest institutional crisis in the history of the Catholic Church. 
I find that the scandal led to a long-lasting decline in Catholic school enrollment 
share and the number of Catholic schools. Within 7 years after the scandal, the affected 
outcomes did not revert to pre-scandal levels. Public notices of allegations related to the 
abuse scandal account for about two-thirds of the decline in Catholic school enrollment 
share and the number of Catholic schools. The results also imply that there is a 
meaningful difference between pre- and post- 2002 in terms of the effect of abuse 
allegations on Catholic school enrollment share and number of schools.  
I provide suggestive evidence that the aforementioned difference between these 
two time periods stems from a fundamental difference in media coverage of the scandal 
before and after 2002. News media has the power to influence the visibility of the events 
in public’s mind by highlighting a limited number of key public issues at any given time. 
The more frequently and prominently the news media covers an issue, the more that issue 
becomes accessible in audience’s mind and that issue is considered as more important 
(Merritt & McCombs, 2004). Allegations of child abuse in the Catholic Church received 
highlighted and emphatic coverage only after 2002.  The significant and distinguished 
media coverage that the child abuse notices received after 2002 increased the public 
awareness of this issue and brought it to the forefront of the public’s attention.  
This paper contributes to a literature that studies the impact of the scandal on 
different outcomes. Hungerman (2013) looked at the relationship between abuse 
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allegations and religious participation and charitable activities with state-level data. He 
found that the scandal led to a substitution away from Catholicism.  Dills and Hernandez-
Julian (2012) examined the effect of the scandal on Catholic school availability and 
enrollment share with diocese-level data and found that the scandal had a small negative 
effect on the availability of Catholic schools and had no effect on the enrollment share. 
Bottan and Perez-Truglia (2011) investigated the relationship between abuse allegations 
and provision of social services with the zip code-level data. They found that the scandal 
caused a long-lasting decline in religious congregation, charitable giving, and the 
provision of social services, including Catholic schools. In this paper, I contribute by 
modeling the differing effects of abuse notices before and after 2002. I also look at the 
effect of negative publicity on Catholic schools over time.  
The approach of this paper is primarily to identify the effect of the enhanced 
public awareness that occurred after 2002. Using diocese level panel data on Catholic 
school enrollment coupled with a rich set of control variables, I empirically examine the 
effect of publicity, and consequently, public awareness of child abuse scandal on Catholic 
school enrollment. The empirical strategy is to employ this peak in media coverage to 
construct an estimate of the effect of awareness of abuse on Catholic School enrollment. I 
contend that the timing of the peak in media coverage of the issue is exogenous and the 
following reports of abuse therefore have the potential to have real effects on parental 
behavior.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1.2 provides background on the 
scope and the consequences of the Catholic child abuse scandal and reviews the relevant 
literature. In Section 1.3, I describe the data. Section 1.4 presents the methodology. I 
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discuss the results of different specifications and analyze the effect of negative publicity 
over time in section 1.5. Section 1.6 concludes. 
 
1.2. Background 
The Catholic child abuse scandal refers to a series of allegations of child abuse 
crimes committed by Catholic orders. Victims of the scandal were as young as three 
years old, with the majority between the ages of 10 and 14; 82% of the victims were 
male. The U.S. bishops have reported receiving allegations of abuse from 16,324 victims 
by 6,115 priests between 1950 and 2012. These numbers are believed to be 
underestimated (Bishopaccountability.org and United States Conference of Catholic 
Bishops report, 2012). More than 3,000 civil lawsuits have been filed from 1984-2009 
and some estimates show that the Catholic Church has paid more than 3 billion dollars in 
settlements and fees to the victims (Bishopaccountability.org, 2012). Five dioceses 
received bankruptcy protection and eight have declared bankruptcy in response to the 
ever increasing claims of abuse. Many of the charges have been brought against the 
Church several decades after the actual abuse occurred. The scandal led to the loss of two 
million memberships in the Catholic Church, or 3 percent of all Catholics (Hungerman, 
2013). There are also cases against Catholic hierarchy who did not report sex abuse 
allegations to the legal authorities. It is known that many abusive priests were moved to 
other parishes in order to be protected against law where abuse sometimes continued 
(Boston.com, 2004). In March 2010, Pope Benedict apologized for the abuse of children, 
saying he was “truly sorry” for their decades of suffering (Dailymail.co.uk, 2010). Pope 
Francis also asked the Catholic Church to “act decisively” to eradicate the sexual abuse 
of children (Huffingtonpost.com, 2013). 
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Media coverage of the scandal in the United State is mostly concentrated after 
2002.  In that year, the Boston Globe began publishing their Pulitzer-prize winning 
critical investigation. Despite the existence of previous reports on the issue, the Boston 
Globe’s coverage resonated strongly around the country and the world. There are 
potentially two main reasons for the widespread dissemination. First, the Boston Globe 
decided to contest the confidentiality order imposed by a superior court to protect Church 
documents concerning one priest. In November 2001, a judge ruled that the 
confidentiality order in this case should be lifted, and the documents became available in 
January 2002 (Boston.com, 2002). This led to an even bigger release of documented 
information on the issue when a judge ordered the archdiocese of Boston to release all the 
private files on every Boston priest accused of sexual abuse. These new files provided 
details on the transgressions of more than 100 priests (Foxnews.com, 2003). The 
availability of these documents to the public shed light to the scope of the problem and 
raised many questions about the reliability of the institution. Additionally, internet access 
enabled many people all across the country to read the reports.  
In order to proceed with the analysis of the effect of this negative publicity on 
enrollment decisions, one needs to identify the channels by which the causal relationship 
between public awareness through publicity of child abuse and the demand for Catholic 
schooling can be explained. First, public concern about the Church’s ability to protect 
children may affect the general perception of the institution. Second, the financial burden 
from both lawsuits and decreased donations may prevent the Church from reinvestment 
in educational activities (Bottan & Perez-Truglia, 2013; Hungerman, 2013). Some of 
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these factors might not have an immediate impact, but play a more significant role as 
time passes. 
Dills and Hernandez-Julian (2012) provided the first published study that 
specifically tests the effect of negative publicity from the abuse scandal on Catholic 
schools. They found that the public negativity derived from media coverage of child 
abuse had a very small effect on the total number of Catholic schools and almost no 
effect on enrollment share throughout the country. In their paper, negative publicity 
resulting from media coverage of the scandal can approximately explain 5 percent of the 
decline in the availability of Catholic schools. They suggest that changes in 
demographics, particularly an increasing Hispanic population, can explain a larger 
proportion of the decline in Catholic schooling. However, their analysis is limited to the 
contemporaneous effect of negative publicity on Catholic schools.  Bottan and Perez-
Truglia (2013) studied the effect of negative publicity on Catholic schools along with 
other social services provided by the Catholic Church over time. Unlike Dills and 
Hernandez-Julian, they provided evidence that the Catholic sex abuse scandal played an 
important role in the decline of the U.S. Catholic school system. They found that the 
scandal had a long-run effect of the number of Catholic schools. They suggest that the 
scandal accounts for 23% of the decline in the number of Catholic schools.  
In the current study, I contend that there is a fundamental difference in media 
coverage of the scandal prior to 2002 and afterwards. The priorities of the mass media 
have a significant impact in shaping the public’s priorities. There is well-established 
evidence that the news media has the power to set a nation’s agenda by focusing on a few 
key public issues. People not only acquire information about public affairs but also 
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evaluate its relative importance based on the emphasis placed by the news media. In other 
words, “the news media can set the agenda for the public’s attention to that small group 
of issues around which public opinion forms” (Merritt & McCombs, 2004).  
The agenda of a news organization can be observed in its coverage pattern of 
public issues in a given period of time. Over this period, a few topics receive emphatic 
coverage, some are covered lightly, and others are rarely mentioned. Newspapers send 
signals to their audiences about the salience of the topics in daily news by publishing the 
lead story on the front page, other front page display, and large headlines. A televised 
newscast’s opening story and the length of time devoted to the story has the same 
function for television (Merritt & McCombs, 2004). Agenda setting theory describes “the 
ability to influence the salience of topics on the public agenda” (Iyengar & Kinder, 1987). 
That is, if the news item coverage is frequent and distinguished, the audience will regard 
the issue as more important. Public opinion polls usually assess the variation of public 
agenda. This theory is concisely explained by Cohen, who noted that the press “may not 
be successful much of the time in telling people what to think, but it is stunningly 
successful in telling its readers what to think about” (Cohen, 1963). 
I argue that the extent of public notices issued following abuse revelations, as 
measured by previous research, might not identify the potential impact of the abuse 
scandal if many of these notices were not sufficiently recognized. The level of 
importance the mass media assigned to child abuse in the Catholic Church after 2002 
deeply changed the public’s attitude toward this issue and the attention to which it was 
paid. I view this event as providing a critical timing dimension that allows typical 
statistical evaluation tools to be employed. It is this approach that differs from the two 
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preceding studies. In order to provide qualitative evidence in support of this claim, it can 
be noted that even though actual abuse peaked in the 1970’s, the majority of victims did 
not register complaints until after 2002. Moreover, for the first time, issues concerning 
child abuse appeared in the Gallup Public Opinion Poll as one of the most important 
issues in 2002 and 2003. In 2002, people responded that child abuse would be one of the 
most important issues facing the nation 25 years from now (The Gallup Public Opinion 
Poll, 2002, and 2003). As it was previously mentioned, public opinion polls usually 
evaluate the public agenda at any given time. It is additional evidence that despite the 
existence of previous reports concerning this issue, public’s attention has been drawn to 
the child abuse notices only after 2002. In the present study, I model the differing effects 
of abuse notices before and after 2002.  
I also explore the effect of negative publicity on Catholic school enrollment over 
time. It is important to know whether parental response to public notices of child abuse in 
the Catholic Church is immediate and whether the impact of these notices remain in 
effect for a long span of time. From a practical perspective, awareness and reaction of a 
scandal in a given year may hit after that year’s enrollment decision is made.  Moreover, 
it is likely that the public’s perception of the Catholic Church depends on a lengthy 
history of public notices, rather than just the most recent period. Additionally, some 
factors such as financial burden can affect the demand for Catholic schools indirectly 
occur with a delay.   I take seriously the pattern of reaction to abuse claims over time, 
both before and after the heightened media attention that began in 2002. 
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1.3. Construction of Panel Data on the Abuse Scandal  
In order to examine the relationship between the publicity of the child abuse 
scandal and Catholic school enrollment, one needs to define publicity over time and 
space. I use the number of Church employees per 100,000 people in a population who 
were publicly accused for the first time of abuse in a particular diocese and period. 
Again, I anticipate that this measure will be more pronounced after 2002. 
I use the website bishopaccounatability.org for data on abuse accusations. The 
website compiles information on more than 3,500 Catholic Church employees who have 
been involved in child abuse cases. This website is run by a non-profit organization based 
in Massachusetts with the goal of providing a comprehensive archive of every publicly 
available document and report on the crisis. As a result, the standard of inclusion of any 
document is broad. These documents provide data on where and when the accused 
served, as well as the dates that the Church and the public were informed. It also includes 
information about the cases that led to arrests, indictments, convictions, confessions, 
settlements, and lawsuits. Although the content of these documents is not verified, each 
reported allegation has been double-checked with a cited source document and contains 
citations.  Wherever possible, there is a link to the main source. It should be noted that I 
am interested in creating a variable to measure publicity, which is not necessarily 
dependent on 100% accuracy of the content of the documents. An unproven allegation in 
the press could be detrimental to the reputation of an institution or an individual. 
Figure 1.1 illustrates the total number of accusations, as well as the total number of 
convictions, arrests, lawsuits, settlements, or confessions that I label as a significant 
accusation for every two year span. The observed trend is reasonably consistent with the 
trend of credible allegations reported by dioceses outlined in annual reports of United 
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States Conference of Catholic Bishops (The Nature and Scope of Sexual Abuse of 
Minors by Catholic Priests and Deacons in the United States 1950-2002, Figure 5.2.1, 
2004; Report on the Implementation of the Charter for the Protection of Children and 
Young People, Table 1, 2012) as well as Dills and Hernandez-Julian’s trend (Figure 2, 
page 146). Public notices are not uniformly distributed among dioceses. While a few 
diocese, such as, Los Angeles, Boston, Chicago, and New York, have recognized many, 
the rest have received significantly fewer notices.  
I aggregate Catholic school enrollment data to the diocese level using the Private 
School Universe Survey. This survey is conducted by the National Center for Education 
Statistics and provides biennial data on different types of private schools, including 
Catholic, other religions, and nondenominational institutions. Beginning in 1995, the 
definition of private school in this survey was expanded to include schools for which 
kindergarten is the highest grade. To avoid any inconsistency, enrollment data for 
kindergarten and pre-kindergarten were removed from the database. Figure 1.2, and 
figure 1.3 show the fraction of the school age population who are enrolled in Catholic 
schools and the number of Catholic schools in thousands at the same period of the time. 
In different specifications, I also include a vector of time-diocese-variant variables 
that control for socioeconomic and demographic changes. It includes data on the 
unemployment rate, real per capita income, the percentage of the population above age 
25 with a bachelor’s degree or higher, the relative percentage of the Hispanic population, 
population density in terms of the population in thousands per square mile, and the 
percentage of Catholic population.  I use multiple county level databases to build the 
control variables. I geographically match each county with its associated diocese and 
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aggregate the data. Annual unemployment rates are obtained from the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics. Educational attainment data is collected from the Census Bureau aligned with 
educational attainment estimates by Bode (2010).  I use the decennial survey of Churches 
and Church Membership in the United States in 1990, 2000, and 2010 coupled with 
information on the website catholic-hierarchy.org to obtain the percentage of Catholic 
population in each diocese.1 I use these data points to interpolate values for the 
intervening years. Finally, I used data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis for 
obtaining per capita income data.2  Dioceses from Alaska and Hawaii are excluded from 
this study as a large portion of their socioeconomics data points for the time period before 
2002 are missing.3  
After combining these data, I am left with biennial panel data from 1991-2009. Table 
1.1 presents the summary statistics for the variables in the analysis for dioceses that have 
received the greatest amount of public notices and other diocese separately.4 It is clear 
that the number of public notices increased dramatically after 2002 for both groups. 
However, the most affected dioceses have notably larger increase. They also have higher 
enrollment share and number of Catholic schools than the rest of the sample, as well as a 
larger Catholic population. There is nothing notably different about unemployment rates 
between the two groups. The percentage of the population with a bachelor degree and 
                                                          
1
 This data are collected by the Association of American Religious Bodies (ASARB) and distributed by the 
Association of Religious Data Archives. 
2
 Data on populations and demographics are gathered from the National Cancer Institute. This center 
utilizes the decennial Census to estimate annual county level population and demographic changes. 
3
 The results of those including dioceses from Alaska and Hawaii are qualitatively the same and they will 
be available upon request. 
4
 I consider any diocese that has recognized more than 50 public notices over the sample period as a heavily 
affected diocese. These include Los Angeles, Chicago, Louisville, Boston, Manchester, Rockville Center, 
Portland, Philadelphia, Baltimore, and New York 
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higher, real per capita income, and the Hispanic population share are higher for the more 
affected group, however, they have increased for both groups over time. 
  
1.4. Methodology 
 
1.4.1. Basic Empirical Model   
I begin by using a weighted least square framework to estimate the effect of 
publicity of the child abuse scandal on Catholic school enrollment. The variable pu 
represents publicity, which is measured as the number of Catholic Church employees per 
100,000 people in population who were publicly accused for the first time in each period. 
The basic regression is summarized by: 
 
1log( ) log(pu ) ( )it i t it it ity Xα γ β δ ε′= + + + +      (1) 
 
This regression is weighted by the population of school age children in each diocese to 
assign lower weight to smaller dioceses in which enrollment is more volatile (following a 
procedure by Abouk and Adams, 2013). All the variables are log transformed; therefore, 
the coefficients can be interpreted as elacticities in this framework. The dependent 
variable is either the log  number enrolled in Catholic schools per 100,000 school-aged 
children or the log number of Catholic schools per every thousand school age child in 
year t and diocese i at the beginning of the school year. I include diocese fixed effects 
that account for time invariant characteristics of the diocese (α) and year fixed effects (γ). 
Xit is a vector of time and diocese variant control variables. Standard errors are clustered 
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by diocese. In some specifications I include the interaction of diocese dummies with time 
to control for diocese-specific time trends. 
I suspect that regression equation 1 might mask the lagged effects of publicity on 
Catholic school enrollment. To address this possibility, I include lags of puit in different 
specifications. As a result, I can study whether the effect of publicity will grow or fade 
when time passes. I suspect the stronger effect to occur with at least a one-period lag as 
parents are able to react to news and change enrollment decisions. This new regression 
can be summarized by: 
 
3
0
log( ) log(pu ) ( )it i t it it ity X
τ
τ τα γ β δ ε
=
−
′= + + + +∑    (2) 
 
To initiate my investigation of whether there is a systematic difference in the 
effect of notices between before and after 2002, I run the same regression for each of 
these subsamples separately.  
 
1.4.2. Difference-in-Difference Framework  
Following a procedure by Card (1992), the empirical strategy to identify more 
formally the unique influence of the media coverage after 2002 is summarized by: 
 
1( )log( ) log(pu )*d ( )tit i t it it ity Xα γ β δ ε′= + + + +    (3) 
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Variable dt is a dummy variable which is equal to 1 if accusation was made after 
2002 and 0 otherwise. This variable represents the time that the child abuse scandal 
became a widespread concern as a result of massive coverage of the issue. I argue that the 
timing of the peak in media coverage (dt) is exogenous. The primary reason for the 
intensified coverage of the child abuse scandal in 2002 is that confidential Church 
documents on the issue became available to the public as a result of contest by the Boston 
Globe to the imposed confidentiality order. This coupled with the increasing penetration 
of internet access made it easier for audiences all over the nation to have access to and 
read the reports. There is no reason to believe that the unsealing of documents was driven 
by other issues in the Catholic Church that might affect enrollment in Catholic schools.   
Equation 3 contains the other control variables from earlier estimations. This 
regression is weighted by the population of school age children in each diocese as well.  
To investigate the possibility of lagged effects, I add a series of lag variables to equation 
3 (equation 4). This regression is summarized by: 
 
3
0
( )log( ) log(pu )*d ( )tit i t it it ity X
τ
τ τα γ β δ ε
=
−
′= + + + +∑   (4) 
  
Coefficients of β1 through β3 show the pattern of lagged effects of the publicity of 
child abuse on Catholic school enrollment and the number of Catholic schools.  
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1.5. Results  
 
1.5.1. Basic Results  
Table 1.2 presents the results of the basic weighted least squares regression 
(equation 1). The second column in each set of regressions includes the linear diocese-
specific time trends, as well as the vector of control covariates. The effect of publicity on 
enrollment share of Catholic schools is small and statistically insignificant in both 
specifications. These results are consistent with Dills and Hernandez-Julian (2012).  
It is noteworthy that I aggregate the number of public notices over a two year 
period to construct the variable of negative publicity. One should take into account that 
the reaction to the revelation of new information about child abuse can happen after the 
year’s enrollment decision is made. As a result, the coefficient on the negative publicity 
variable might be more likely to be negative in my study compared with Dills and 
Hernandez-Julian’s paper due to the fact that the coefficient captures this delayed effect 
of negative publicity at any given time, in addition to the contemporaneous effect.  
Table 1.3 presents the results of the lagged effects of publicity. This again allows 
for the possibility that families may take some time in making their enrollment decisions.  
One can conclude from these estimates that the publicity of child abuse has a negative 
and significant effect on Catholic school enrollment share, and that this effect indeed 
grows over time. The estimates are qualitatively the same after inclusion of the diocese-
specific time trends.  These results are consistent with Bottan and Perez-Truglia (2013). 
In Table 1.3, I also divide the sample between periods before and after 2002.  The 
variable publicity has no power of prediction when I restrict the sample only to the period 
before 2002. The estimates are positive, small, and insignificant. Contrary to these 
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findings, the estimates are negative and significant for the subsample after 2002. The null 
hypothesis that the two subsamples have equal coefficients for the variable publicity and 
its lags can be rejected by conducting the Chow test (Chow, 1960). 
The coefficients of interest when the number of Catholic schools is the dependent 
variable are also negative, but they are not significant in the overall specification. When I 
separate the sample before and after 2002, the same pattern of more substantial effects 
after 2002 holds.5 
These results indicate that there is a meaningful difference between pre- and post- 
2002 in terms of the effects of accusations on school enrollment and number of schools. 
There was modest media coverage prior to 2002, but people did not respond to it. Unlike 
the current study and Bottan and Perez-Truglia’s study, Dills and Hernandez-Julian did 
not find any lagged effects of negative publicity. It is worthwhile to point out a distinct 
difference between the databases used in these different studies. Dills and Hernandez-
Julian used an annual panel data from 1990-2007 while Bottan and Perez-Truglia made 
use of a biennial data and I am using the same database. As a result, the number of panel 
data waves before 2002 in Dills and Hernandez-Julian’s study is noticeably larger than 
mine. As it can be inferred from the results in Table 1.3, the non-negligible negative 
effect of negative publicity of child abuse scandal on Catholic school enrollment is 
derived from public notices that realized after 2002. Inclusion of public notices from the 
period before 2002 biases the coefficient toward zero, however, the negative effect may 
be still observed when the panel data waves are distributed evenly before and after 2002. 
When the number of panel data waves prior to 2002 is much greater than after 2002, the 
                                                          
5
 The results of those included the diocese-specific time trends are not included in Table 1.3 and are 
available upon request. 
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coefficients are likely to approach zero. Ignoring this important property of the news 
coverage of the scandal and utilizing a larger panel data waves before 2002 likely 
explains the small and insignificant findings in Dills and Hernandez-Julian (2012) 
compared with the substantial findings from my study and Bottan and Perez-Truglia’s 
study.  These findings motivate the application of the proposed difference-in-difference 
framework, in which this fundamental difference in media coverage before and after 
2002 is taken into consideration more directly.  
 
1.5.2.  Difference-in-Difference Results Accounting for Change in 2002  
Table 1.4 presents the results of the difference-in-difference regression that 
explicitly measures the effect of reported abuse cases post 2002 (equation 3). The 
dependent variable is either the log of Catholic school enrollment or the log number of 
Catholic schools per thousand of school-age children in dioceses. In each set of 
regressions, I include an increasingly richer set of control variables moving from the first 
column to the third. The first column only contains diocese and year fixed effects. The 
second column adds the vector Xit to the regression analysis, and the third column adds 
diocese-specific time trends.  
The coefficients of interest are negative and significant when I only incorporate 
diocese and year fixed effects in the regressions. Inclusion of the vector Xit results in 
smaller and insignificant coefficients. The results are not robust to inclusion of diocese-
specific time trends either. The outcomes of the basic difference-in-difference analysis in 
Table 1.4 therefore do not offer robust evidence of a contemporaneous causal link 
between publicity and the share and number of Catholic schools. 
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The lack of strong effects in Table 1.4 may stem from the fact that the impact of 
reports takes at least a school year to take hold, as families are unable to immediately 
remove their children from Catholic schools. Table 1.5 presents the results from the 
regression equation 4, which allows for lags. In all the specifications, I control for 
diocese and year fixed effects as well as the vector Xit. Diocese-specific time trends are 
also included in the second column of each set of regressions. One can conclude from the 
results in Table 1.5 that the publicity of the scandal is negatively associated with both the 
enrollment share and number of Catholic schools. The negative effects take a period to 
take hold, but are also sustained over time. The lagged coefficients are jointly significant 
at the 5% significance level for enrollment share of Catholic schools and only marginally 
significant for number of Catholic schools (p-value=0.11). The estimates imply that a one 
percent increase in publicity of the abuse after 2002 is associated with a roughly 0.25 
percent decrease in overall enrollment shares of Catholic schools. Although this estimate 
seems to be quite small, it is worth mentioning that dioceses in the sample experienced an 
enormous increase in public notices.  Back-of-the-envelope calculations suggest that the 
negative publicity derived from the increase in public notices of child abuse can 
approximately explain about two-thirds of the decline in Catholic school enrollment share 
and the number of Catholic schools. 
After inclusion of the diocese-specific time trends, the coefficients become 
smaller and less precise. It is noteworthy that the unemployment rate and the percentage 
of population above age 25 with a bachelor degree or higher cannot explain Catholic 
school enrollment. This could be due to the considerable amount of subsidies provided by 
the Catholic Church to attend Catholic schools. These subsidies usually target those who 
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cannot otherwise afford Catholic schools. The same pattern is also observable for the 
number of Catholic schools. The coefficients weaken after the inclusion of diocese-
specific time trends, but the point estimates remain large and fall just short of 
significance at conventional levels.6 Percentage of Hispanic population and real per 
capita income, however, are now significant predictors of enrollment share and number 
of Catholic schools. The Hispanic population has grown substantially in the past decades, 
and the majority of Hispanics are Catholic. 
 The results of this section reinforce the relative importance that the notices of 
abuse that were made after 2002 had on enrollment.  These effects still took a period to 
be observed in the data, likely because it took time for parents to react.  Those effects still 
continued to grow over time.  There are several additional explanations for such a pattern. 
In modern America, scandals have a long term impact on the shaping of public’s opinion. 
They evolve a life and momentum of their own, which are hard to ignore (Williams, 
1998). The continuous trend of reported allegations of sexual misconduct in recent years 
has helped create and sustain a deep level of public distrust toward the Catholic Church. 
The more reporting there is, the more likely it is that public distrust grows. Although the 
number of allegations dropped after 2005, the newest allegations will emphasize the 
effect of past allegations by communicating the message to the public that the problem 
still exists. This reinforces the public’s distrust of the Catholic Church. Financial burden 
derived from negative publicity of the child abuse scandal is another factor that affects 
Catholic schooling. Catholic schools rely heavily on the financial support provided by 
                                                          
6
 Inclusion of linear time trends most of the time leads to smaller and less precise estimates because it 
captures most of the variation in data. Due to this reason and also the sample size, this change was 
expected. 
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dioceses. Financial constraints stemming from the scandal are likely to affect Catholic 
schools and these constraints happen with a delay and grow over time.   Although I 
cannot distinguish between these explanations for the decline in enrollments, there does 
appear to be room for both possibilities since the number of schools, in addition to 
enrollment, also seems to decline with a noticeable lag.  
 
1.5.3. Additional Estimates 
Throughout this paper, I have argued that the decline in share of Catholic schools 
is exclusively derived from accusations that were realized after 2002. This is the main 
motivation for using the difference-in-difference estimation (equation 4). In order to 
provide more evidence for this argument, I estimate: 
 
3 3
0 0
( ) ( )log( ) log(pu ) log(pu )*d ( )tit i t it it it ity X
τ τ
τ τ τ τα γ β δ ε
= =
− −
∂ + ′= + + + +∑ ∑   (5) 
 
Both models in equations 2 and 4 are nested in this model. If ∂ s in this specification are 
not significantly different from zero, the model will reduce to the proposed difference-in-
difference model. On the other hand, if βs are not significantly different from zero, 
including the accusation from the whole sample is preferred. Table 1.6 presents the 
results of this new regression. The results in Table 1.6 emphasize again the relative 
importance of accusations happened after 2002. δs are not individually and jointly  
significantly different from zero, while the coefficients of accusations after 2002 are 
jointly significant. This provides additional evidence for the difference-in-difference 
framework.  
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I use the model summarized by equation 4 for additional estimates and robustness 
checks. First, one might suspect that the estimates presented thus far might reflect some 
pre-existing trends in the data. For example, it is possible that certain diocese were 
experiencing a reduction in support for Catholicism before the outbreak of the scandal 
and these are the dioceses where people were more likely to make allegations of abuse, 
and this may lead to spurious findings.  In order to address this concern, I control for the 
future accusations in the regression. If the results are driven by a pre-existing trend, the 
inclusion of future accusations should attenuate the coefficients of negative publicity and 
its lags. It is worth mentioning that due to the low number of panel data waves, 
specifically after treatment ones, inclusion of all the contemporaneous effect and lagged 
effects in the equation 4 will raise a problem of colinearity. I present two different 
combinations of leads and lags. I omit some lagged effects in each of these combinations 
based on the number of lead effects included in the regression. The results of these 
specifications are reported in Table 1.7. The coefficients of contemporaneous and lagged 
effects of abuse accusations remain the same. However, lead accusations coefficients are 
much smaller compared with lagged effects and they are all statistically insignificant. It 
indicates that the results are not driven by pre-existing trends.  
I utilize a second definition of publicity, which eliminates the cases that did not 
end with conviction, arrest, lawsuit, settlement, or confession. Panel A in Table 1.8 
presents the results of the effect of significant accusations on enrollment share and 
number of Catholic schools. The second column in each set of regressions includes the 
diocese-specific time trends. The effects of this new measure of publicity on enrollment 
share and number of Catholic schools follow the same patterns as before.  
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Unweighted least squares is an obvious alternative to the main specification, 
which weights estimations based on a diocese’s population. Panel B in Table 1.8 presents 
the results of unweighted least squares and indicate that the weighted least squares results 
presented earlier in the paper provide more conservative estimates. 
Table 1.9 presents the results of the regression analysis of equation 4 for male and 
female students separately. The findings do not imply that the estimates are always 
different for male students than female students in a uniform way.  This is despite males 
being the victims in the vast majority of abuse cases, however, the decline in the 
enrollment share of female students happens with a lag relative to the enrollment share 
for male students. The immediate response for male students is negative and significant, 
which is in line with the more imminent threat perceived by the abuse scandal, and it is 
robust to inclusion of linear time trends. It suggests that risk realization happens for male 
students sooner. This difference in dynamics of response between male and female 
students might be due to the fact that the enrollment decision for female students is 
systematically affected by the comparable decision for their older brothers (Butcher and 
Case, 1994).7 This difference in response dynamics between male and female students 
may also be responsible for insignificant coefficients presented in Table 1.5.  
 
1.6. Conclusion 
In this study, I address the role of mass media in public agenda setting. I argue 
that the child abuse scandal in the Catholic Church, which was widely emphasized by the 
majority of news media beginning in 2002, became more prominent in the public’s mind 
                                                          
7
 The same separation between male and female students was performed on the whole sample, and the 
results are not conclusive.  
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at this time. I used the cumulative number of church employees who have been publicly 
accused at any period as a proxy for negative publicity.  These seem to take on 
heightened importance among parents as measured by Catholic school enrollment after 
2002.  The results suggest that there is a negative relationship between publicity of the 
scandal and the demand and availability of Catholic schools. The effect is also sustained 
over time. This is likely derived from both the growing public distrust and financial 
burden caused by the massive media coverage of the issue. 
Decline in the portion of students who enrolled in Catholic schools happens in a 
different pattern for male and female students. Enrollment share for male students 
decreases immediately in response to the public notices of child abuse and sustains over 
time. This decline for enrollment share of female students occurs with a delay compared 
with men. This implies that risk for male students is considered to be more serious.  
Catholic school attendance is believed to be correlated with better academic and 
labor market outcomes. Catholic schools also provide competition to public schools and 
thereby benefit students in public schools indirectly. The decline in Catholic school 
enrollment could have significant welfare implications if schooling alternatives be limited 
to lower quality institutions. Therefore, it is critical to investigate the most common 
alternative of Catholic schools for parents who have decided to switch to other types of 
schools.  This can be the subject of future research. 
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Figure 1.1. Total number of child abuse accusations and significant accusations  
    
Figure 1.2. Enrollment share of Catholic schools. 
    
Figure 1.3. Number of Catholic schools in thousands 
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Table 1.1. Summary Statistics 
Variables Most affected dioceses  Other dioceses 
 
Whole 
sample 
Before 
2002 
After 
2002  Whole sample 
Before 
2002 After 2002 
Enrollment share of 
Catholic schools 6.891 7.506 5.969  3.757 3.982 3.420 
        
Number of Catholic 
schools  176.714 186.622 161.853  39.611 41.558 36.690 
cumulative accusations 9.58 1.933 21.05  1.269 0.571 2.316 
        
Cumulative significant  
accusations 5.62 1.416 11.925  0.805 0.458 1.326 
        
% population with a 
bachelor’s degree and 
higher 
29.845 27.927 32.723  22.748 21.267 24.971 
unemployment rate 5.840 5.654 6.121  5.904 5.711 6.194 
real per capita income in 
000’s 19.912 18.651 21.803  15.541 14.595 16.960 
        
% Hispanic 12.415 11.232 14.190  10.730 9.598 12.428 
        
population density 1.335 1.311 1.371  0.484 0.472 0.503 
        
% catholic population 33.484 33.680 33.190  21.266 21.445 20.999 
Any diocese that has recognized more than 50 public notices over the sample period is considered as a heavily 
affected diocese. 
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Table 1.2. Basic Weighted Least Square Regression 
 Log (Catholic school 
enrollment share) 
 Log (Number of catholic schools 
per 000’s students) 
VARIABLES (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
      
Log (total accusations) 
 
-0.00281 
(0.0229) 
0.0169 
(0.0168) 
 0.00297 
(0.0249) 
0.00862 
(0.0187) 
 
  
Log (% population with a 
bachelor’s degree and higher) 
-0.00436 
(0.0926) 
-0.0348 
(0.0556) 
 0.00474 
(0.100) 
-0.0647 
(0.0879) 
  
Log (unemployment rate) -0.000511 
(0.0407) 
-0.0672** 
(0.0288) 
 0.0367 
(0.0408) 
0.000429 
(0.0350) 
  
Log (real per capita income) 0.550*** 0.0488  0.468** 0.177 
 (0.161) (0.143)  (0.180) (0.189) 
Log (% Hispanic) 0.232*** 
(0.0410) 
-0.0126 
(0.114) 
 0.166*** 
(0.0390) 
-0.0799 
(0.123) 
  
Log (population density) 0.0373 
(0.294) 
-1.061*** 
(0.249) 
 -0.206 
(0.306) 
-1.009*** 
(0.326) 
  
Log (% catholic population) 0.174** -0.0795  0.131* -0.0930 
 (0.0748) (0.0625)  (0.0784) (0.0567) 
Constant -9.476*** -11.96***  -7.634*** -10.22*** 
 (2.235) (1.494)  (2.437) (2.208) 
      
Linear diocese-specific time 
trend 
No Yes  No Yes 
Observations 1,718 1,718  1,718 1,718 
R-squared 0.984 0.992  0.976 0.985 
Note: There are 172 dioceses, regressions include year and diocese fixed effects. The numbers in 
parenthesis are clustered standard errors at the diocese level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 1.3. Lagged Effects of Basic Weighted Least Square 
 Log (Catholic school enrollment 
share) 
 Log (Number of catholic schools per 
000’s students) 
 Full sample Before 
2002 
After 
2002 
 Full sample Before 
2002 
After 
2002 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
        
Log (total accusations) -0.0223 
(0.0250) 
0.106 
(0.0944) 
-0.0328 
(0.0345) 
 -0.0230 
(0.0255) 
0.206 
(0.188) 
0.0170 
(0.0337) 
     
1st lag of Log (total 
accusations) 
-0.0434* 
(0.0243) 
0.0173 
(0.0729) 
-0.0562* 
(0.0326) 
 -0.0394 
(0.0328) 
0.0481 
(0.0934) 
-0.0197 
(0.0408) 
     
2nd lag of Log (total 
accusations) 
-0.0576** 
(0.0284) 
0.0633 
(0.0505) 
-0.0831** 
(0.0383) 
 -0.0600 
(0.0445) 
0.0148 
(0.0628) 
-0.0401 
(0.0491) 
     
3d lag of Log (total 
accusations) 
-0.0541* 
(0.0298) 
0.0616 
(0.0686) 
-0.0831** 
(0.0328) 
 -0.0648* 
(0.0353) 
-0.0407 
(0.0905) 
-0.0225 
(0.0486) 
     
Log (% population with a 
bachelor’s degree and 
higher) 
0.0278 
(0.106) 
-0.134 
(0.0826) 
-0.177 
(0.135) 
 0.0299 
(0.142) 
0.0235 
(0.101) 
-0.336 
(0.297) 
     
Log (unemployment rate) 0.00566 
(0.0388) 
0.0125 
(0.0423) 
-0.0483 
(0.0486) 
 0.0194 
(0.0405) 
0.0859* 
(0.0471) 
-0.0114 
(0.0585) 
     
Log (real per capita income) 0.474*** 
(0.168) 
0.291 
(0.225) 
0.186 
(0.184) 
 0.452** 
(0.193) 
0.264 
(0.316) 
0.0694 
(0.207) 
     
Log ( % Hispanic) 0.174*** 0.196*** 0.0863  0.163** 0.0916 0.0427 
 (0.0579) (0.0554) (0.137)  (0.0673) (0.0666) (0.161) 
Log (population density) 0.0463 
(0.396) 
0.111 
(0.374) 
0.0986 
(0.271) 
 -0.146 
(0.382) 
-0.161 
(0.478) 
0.0451 
(0.512) 
     
Log (% catholic population) 0.0906 
(0.0661) 
-0.0106 
(0.121) 
-0.0636 
(0.116) 
 0.0756 
(0.0754) 
-0.0327 
(0.0772) 
-0.0347 
(0.131) 
     
Constant -8.884*** -6.768** -7.063***  -7.275** -5.316 -3.772 
 (2.705) (3.035) (2.478)  (2.820) (4.340) (3.300) 
        
Observations 1,204 516 688  1,204 516 688 
R-squared 0.987 0.996 0.991  0.983 0.993 0.986 
Note: There are 172 dioceses, regressions include year and diocese fixed effects. The numbers in parenthesis are 
clustered standard errors at the diocese level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
  
30 
 
 
Table 1.4. Basic Difference-in-Difference 
 Log (Catholic school enrollment share)  Log (Number of catholic schools per 
000’s students) 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
        
Log (total accusations) -0.0808** 
(0.0363) 
-0.0283 
(0.0267) 
0.00767 
(0.0193) 
 -0.0510* 
(0.0295) 
-0.0272 
(0.0277) 
-0.00960 
(0.0200)   
Log (% population with a 
bachelor’s degree and 
higher) 
 -0.00349 
(0.0925) 
-0.0346 
(0.0556) 
  0.00559 
(0.0999) 
-0.0634 
(0.0876) 
    
Log (unemployment rate)  -0.000485 
(0.0407) 
-0.0674** 
(0.0288) 
  0.0366 
(0.0408) 
0.000118 
(0.0349)     
Log (real per capita 
income) 
 0.554*** 
(0.161) 
0.0491 
(0.143) 
  0.472*** 
(0.180) 
0.179 
(0.189) 
    
Log ( % Hispanic)  0.231*** -0.0132   0.164*** -0.0811 
  (0.0408) (0.114)   (0.0389) (0.122) 
Log (population density)  0.0309 
(0.294) 
-1.063*** 
(0.251) 
  -0.213 
(0.307) 
-1.013*** 
(0.329)     
Log (% catholic 
population) 
 0.173** 
(0.0747) 
-0.0800 
(0.0626) 
  0.129 
(0.0786) 
-0.0941* 
(0.0568) 
    
Constant -5.194*** -9.551*** -11.98***  -2.925*** -7.716*** -10.26*** 
 (0.0149) (2.233) (1.492)  (0.0141) (2.442) (2.206) 
        
Linear diocese-specific 
time trend 
No No Yes  No No Yes 
Observations 1,718 1,718 1,718  1,718 1,718 1,718 
R-squared 0.981 0.984 0.992  0.974 0.976 0.985 
Note: There are 172 dioceses, regressions include year and diocese fixed effects. The numbers in parenthesis are 
clustered standard errors at the diocese level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 1.5. Difference-in-Difference with Lagged Effects 
 Log (Catholic school 
enrollment share) 
 Log (Number of catholic schools 
per 000’s students) 
VARIABLES (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
      
Log (total accusations) -0.0353 -0.0334  -0.0428* -0.0475 
 (0.0254) (0.0259)  (0.0253) (0.0318) 
1st lag of Log (total accusations) -0.0513* 
(0.0261) 
-0.0495 
(0.0335) 
 -0.0579 
(0.0353) 
-0.0603 
(0.0474)   
2nd lag of Log (total accusations) -0.0821** 
(0.0326) 
-0.0710* 
(0.0428) 
 -0.0860* 
(0.0515) 
-0.0762 
(0.0664)   
3d lag of Log (total accusations) -0.0866** 
(0.0334) 
-0.0508 
(0.0524) 
 -0.0839** 
(0.0410) 
-0.0219 
(0.0686)   
Log (% population with a bachelor’s degree 
and higher) 
0.0254 
(0.105) 
-0.0603 
(0.0877) 
 0.0271 
(0.141) 
-0.0879 
(0.162) 
  
Log (unemployment rate) 0.0130 -0.0497  0.0273 -0.0150 
 (0.0383) (0.0375)  (0.0398) (0.0419) 
Log (real per capita income) 0.506*** 0.102  0.485** 0.0663 
 (0.168) (0.158)  (0.189) (0.168) 
Log ( % Hispanic) 0.160*** 0.0324  0.148** -0.0175 
 (0.0576) (0.127)  (0.0660) (0.154) 
Log (population density) -0.00447 -1.269***  -0.199 -1.323*** 
 (0.395) (0.399)  (0.380) (0.502) 
Log (% catholic population) 0.0795 -0.0754  0.0637 -0.0691 
 (0.0645) (0.0697)  (0.0748) (0.0727) 
Constant -9.455*** -13.35***  -7.872*** -10.66*** 
 (2.712) (2.325)  (2.775) (2.965) 
      
Linear diocese-specific time trend No Yes  No Yes 
Observations 1,204 1,204  1,204 1,204 
R-squared 0.987 0.994  0.983 0.990 
Note: There are 172 dioceses, regressions include year and diocese fixed effects. The numbers in parenthesis are 
clustered standard errors at the diocese level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 1.6. Nested Model 
 Log (Catholic school 
enrollment share) 
 Log ( Number of Catholic 
schools per 000’s students) 
VARIABLES (1)  (2) 
    
0∂  0.0622 (0.104) 
 0.212 
(0.135) 
  
1∂  -0.0223 (0.0641) 
 0.0596 
(0.0594) 
  
2∂  -0.0186 (0.0563) 
 -0.0175 
(0.0621) 
  
3∂  0.00561 (0.0413) 
 -0.0371 
(0.0425) 
  
0β  -0.106 (0.111)  -0.262* (0.142) 
  
1β  -0.0454 (0.0773)  -0.125 (0.0762) 
  
2β  -0.0985 (0.0692)  -0.0869 (0.0772) 
  
3β  -0.127** (0.0495)  -0.0682 (0.0574) 
  
Constant -11.65***  -9.277*** 
 (2.349)  (2.248) 
    
Observations 1,204  1,204 
R-squared 0.976  0.972 
Panel B- Hypothesis Test 
    
1 2 3 4 0∂ = ∂ = ∂ = ∂ =
 
0.28  0.91 
P-Value 0.8898  0.4573 
    
1 2 3 4 0∂ + ∂ + ∂ + ∂ =
 
0.02  1.33 
P-Value 0.8850  0.2507 
    
1 2 3 4 0β β β β= = = =
 
2.24  1.30 
P-Value 0.0663  0.2736 
    
1 2 3 4 0β β β β+ + + =
 
2.83  5.02 
P-Value 0.0944  0.0263 
    
Note: There are 172 dioceses, regressions include year and diocese fixed effects. The numbers in 
parenthesis are clustered standard errors at the diocese level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 1.7. Difference-in-Difference with Lead and Lagged Effects 
 Log (Catholic school enrollment 
share) 
 Log (Number of catholic 
schools per 000’s students) 
VARIABLES (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
      
Log (total accusations) -0.0306 
(0.0288) 
-0.0299 
(0.0300) 
 -0.0428 
(0.0286) 
-0.0398 
(0.0376) 
   
1st lag of Log (total accusations) -0.0540* 
(0.0302) 
-0.0654** 
(0.0315) 
 -0.0662 
(0.0436) 
-0.107** 
(0.0420) 
   
2nd lag of Log (total accusations) -0.100*** 
(0.0350) 
  -0.135** 
(0.0526) 
 
    
1st lead of Log (total accusations) -0.00867 
(0.0260) 
-0.0157 
(0.0276) 
 -0.00433 
(0.0261) 
-0.00747 
(0.0279) 
   
2nd lead of Log (total accusations)  -0.00542 
(0.0218) 
  0.0239 
(0.0251) 
     
Constant -10.61*** -10.92***  -8.982** -10.44*** 
 (2.966) (2.913)  (3.560) (3.022) 
      
Observations 1,204 1,203  1,204 1,203 
R-squared 0.987 0.988  0.983 0.979 
Note: There are 172 dioceses, regressions include year and diocese fixed effects. The numbers in parenthesis 
are clustered standard errors at the diocese level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
  
34 
 
 
Table 1.8. Robustness Checks 
Panel A: The Effect of Significant Accusations 
 Log (Catholic school enrollment 
share) 
 Log (Number of catholic 
schools per 000’s students) 
VARIABLES (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
      
Log (total significant accusations) -0.0389 
(0.0288) 
-0.0253 
(0.0296) 
 -0.0870*** 
(0.0281) 
-0.0786* 
(0.0406)   
1st lag of Log (total significant 
accusations) 
-0.0742** 
(0.0361) 
-0.0685 
(0.0475) 
 -0.0997** 
(0.0414) 
-0.0963 
(0.0591) 
  
2nd lag of Log (total significant 
accusations) 
-0.0973*** 
(0.0356) 
-0.0638 
(0.0549) 
 -0.110** 
(0.0440) 
-0.0881 
(0.0711) 
  
3d lag of Log (total significant 
accusations) 
-0.0647 
(0.0395) 
-0.0802 
(0.0629) 
 -0.0807 
(0.0519) 
-0.0674 
(0.0824) 
  
Constant -9.098*** -13.27***  -7.666*** -10.61*** 
 (2.716) (2.342)  (2.792) (2.958) 
      
Linear diocese-specific time trend No Yes  No Yes 
Observations 1,204 1,204  1,204 1,204 
R-squared 0.987 0.994  0.983 0.990 
Panel B: Unweighted Least Square 
 Log (Catholic school enrollment 
share) 
 Log (Number of catholic 
schools per 000’s students) 
VARIABLES (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
      
Log (total accusations) -0.0445 -0.0448  -0.0527* -0.0592* 
 (0.0290) (0.0324)  (0.0300) (0.0325) 
1st lag of Log (total accusations) -0.0676** 
(0.0323) 
-0.0696 
(0.0503) 
 -0.0681** 
(0.0333) 
-0.0683 
(0.0524)   
2nd lag of Log (total accusations) -0.117*** 
(0.0379) 
-0.115* 
(0.0595) 
 -0.106*** 
(0.0353) 
-0.0943 
(0.0623)   
3d lag of Log (total accusations) -0.121*** 
(0.0350) 
-0.115 
(0.0738) 
 -0.106** 
(0.0410) 
-0.0968 
(0.0799)   
Constant -12.00*** -12.08***  -9.090*** -10.56*** 
 (2.202) (3.534)  (2.131) (3.451) 
      
Linear diocese-specific time trend No Yes  No Yes 
Observations 1,204 1,204  1,204 1,204 
R-squared 0.976 0.986  0.972 0.985 
Note: There are 172 dioceses, regressions include year and diocese fixed effects. The numbers in parenthesis 
are clustered standard errors at the diocese level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 1.9. Effect of Publicity by Gender 
 Log (Catholic school male students 
enrollment share) 
 Log (Catholic school female 
students enrollment share) 
VARIABLES (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
      
Log (total accusations) -0.0460* -0.0519**  -0.0365 -0.0293 
 (0.0272) (0.0247)  (0.0267) (0.0283) 
1st lag of Log (total accusations) -0.0508* 
(0.0267) 
-0.0569 
(0.0377) 
 -0.0727*** 
(0.0269) 
-0.0566 
(0.0375)   
2nd lag of Log (total accusations) -0.0886** 
(0.0388) 
-0.0835* 
(0.0468) 
 -0.0850** 
(0.0342) 
-0.0520 
(0.0480)   
3d lag of Log (total accusations) -0.0871** 
(0.0352) 
-0.0473 
(0.0554) 
 -0.114*** 
(0.0331) 
-0.0394 
(0.0579)   
Constant -9.383*** -14.20***  -9.330*** -14.49*** 
 (2.967) (3.038)  (2.788) (2.223) 
      
Linear diocese-specific time trend No Yes  No Yes 
Observations 1,204 1,204  1,204 1,204 
R-squared 0.984 0.992  0.983 0.991 
Note: There are 172 dioceses, regressions include year and diocese fixed effects. The numbers in parenthesis are 
clustered standard errors at the diocese level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Chapter 2: School Mandates, Education for Parents, or Physician 
Recommendations? The Most Effective Way to Increase Human 
Papillomavirus Vaccine Coverage  
 
2.1. Introduction  
About 20 million people are currently infected with Human Papillomavirus 
(HPV) in the United States.  About half of these infections are among adolescents and 
young adults between 15 to 24 years old. HPV is the most common sexually transmitted 
disease. Among the more than 40 HPV types that infect human mucosal, most infections 
are asymptotic and transient; however, certain oncogenic types can cause cervical cancer 
and a number of less common cancers, including cancers of the anus, penis, and vulva. 
Other non-congenic types can cause genital warts. Every year about 12,000 women are 
newly diagnosed with cervical cancer, and about 4,000 women die from this cancer in the 
United States. About 1% of sexually active males and females in the U.S. have genital 
warts at any given time (Center for Disease Control and Prevention, 2014). 
Two vaccines have been developed recently to protect against HPV. The bivalent 
vaccine (Cervarix) prevents two HPV types, 16 and 18. These two types are responsible 
for about 70% of cervical cancers. The quadrivalent vaccine (Gardasil) protects against 
HPV types 16 and 18, as well as HPV types 6 and 11, which cause 90% of genital warts. 
The quadrivalent vaccine can also protect against cancer of the anus, vagina, and vulva.  
The full immunization includes three doses of vaccine in the course of six months. 
Research conducted on the safety of this vaccine did not show any safety concern, and 
both vaccines were found to be safe. Some mild side effects of the vaccine have been 
reported, such as pain where the shot was given, fever, dizziness, and nausea (Center for 
Disease Control and Prevention, 2014). 
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The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approved Gardasil at 2006 and 
Cervarix at 2009. The Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP) 
recommends either HPV vaccine for routine vaccination for all girls 11 to 12 years old 
and catch-up vaccination for those 13 to 26 years old who have not been vaccinated 
previously. Only the quadrivalent vaccine is routinely recommended for boys 11 to 12 
years old, and catch-up vaccination is recommended for 13 through 21 year old males. 
This vaccine is also recommended for gay and bisexual men, and people with 
compromised immune systems. The main reason for recommending the vaccine for the 
age range of 11-12 years old is to increase the efficacy of the vaccination. HPV 
vaccination does not protect against the viruses that an individual is already exposed. As 
a result, vaccination at earlier ages will increase the likelihood that immunization would 
occur before any sexual activity. Moreover, it has been efforts to synchronize HPV 
vaccine delivery with other adolescent required vaccines (Daley et al., 2010).  
In order to increase the immunity against this virus, many states have enacted 
HPV vaccine related laws. This legislation ranges widely; however, most of this 
legislation in general can be divided into five categories: school mandates, public 
awareness campaigns, education for parents, education for school children, and health 
insurance mandates. Figure 2.1 shows the number of states in each category. The ultimate 
goal of this research is to investigate whether two general classes of policies, school 
mandates and educational programs for parents, have promoted the vaccination or not. 
These two policies vary significantly in terms of incurred costs and also the extent that 
they interfere with freedom of choice, and as a result, it should be of interest to public 
health policy makers. Providing information for parents can happen at very low cost, and 
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if this policy is more effective in promoting the vaccine, the cost-benefit analysis would 
indicate that this policy is preferred. It is also preferred from a political economic 
perspective because it interferes less with parental choice. To compare the effectiveness 
of these policies to a baseline treatment, I also intend to study the effect of physician 
recommendation on the HPV vaccine decisions. The variable indicating receipt of advice 
from a physician is non-experimental and potentially endogenous, but I employ an 
instrumental variable approach that is specifically designed to address the endogeneity 
problem.  
Many studies have investigated different aspects of the determinants of vaccine 
acceptance. Higher income levels and having health insurance are shown to be positively 
correlated with vaccinations (Jain et al., 2009). Greater awareness of HPV is associated 
with greater vaccine acceptability (Jain et al., 2009 & Black et al., 2009). However, there 
are some serious empirical limitations to these studies. Initiation and completion of the 
vaccine is found to be associated with patient’s age. The receipt is lowest among the 
youngest and oldest eligible age groups and highest among the mid teenagers (Robin et 
al., 2014).  
To best of my knowledge, Bugenske et al., (2012) provided the only published 
study that explicitly investigates the effect of middle school requirement policies, 
including school mandates and parental education requirements, on the vaccination rate. 
They found no association between parental education requirements and the coverage 
level for HPV. However, this study is only confined to the vaccination rate mean 
comparison between treatment and control states, while there might be substantive 
differences between state characteristics. These characteristics can affect the vaccination 
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rate through channels other than these policies, and these differences are not addressed in 
this study. As a result, this severe limitation in the applied statistical method makes it 
difficult to draw a comprehensive conclusion from the results. The current study, 
however, both controls for the differences in state characteristics, as well as empirically 
employs a rich individual level data to study the effect of aforementioned policies on the 
decision to initiate or complete the sequence of HPV vaccine. 
Some studies have focused on the effect of health care provider and physician 
recommendation on the vaccine decision as well and found that receiving a physician 
recommendation is an important factor (Yilato, et al., 2013 & Rosenthal, et al., 2011). 
Parents frequently cited not having a physician recommendation as reason for not 
vaccinating their child (Holman, et al., 2014). Physician failure to start a conversation 
about HPV vaccine was a leading reason of delayed or missed immunization 
opportunities among African American adolescents even when mother expressed a strong 
commitment to HPV immunization (Hamlish et al., 2012). It was even more likely for 
parents of sons than girls to indicate not having a physician recommendation as the main 
reason for vaccine refusal (Laz et al., 2012). However, none of these studies took 
potential endogeneity of receiving a physician recommendation into account. In this 
study, I address the potential endogeneity by employing an instrumental variable 
approach.  
The most important finding of this paper is that the perceived risk of infection is 
an important determinant factor in the ultimate success of a policy. In general, these 
policies were less successful in encouraging the vaccine among children younger than 13 
years old. This is mainly due to the fact that the perceived risk of infection is quite low in 
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this age range, considering the fact that HPV is a sexually transmitted disease. The 
policies appear to have a limited impact at best on the vaccine outcomes among girls 
older than 13 years old. This implies that increasing parental awareness can lead to an 
increase in vaccine initiation; however, parents are willing to wait for their child to 
become older, and it is the time that the perceived risk of infection is greater.  
Physician recommendation, however, is shown to be a strong determinant in 
initiating and completing the vaccination sequence, as well as initiating the vaccine 
before the age of 13. The strongest effect of physician recommendation can be observed 
on the decision to initiate the vaccine. This effect is found to be stronger than the effect of 
any policy and obviously much cheaper. The results support the argument that receipt of 
advice from a physician should be treated as an endogenous regressor.  Estimates that 
ignore the potential endogeneity will result in underestimating the true effect of physician 
recommendation on vaccine initiation and completion. I also present suggestive evidence 
that physicians tend to recommend the vaccine to those who are less likely to initiate the 
vaccination by their own.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 provides a background 
of different policies in effect in various states. In section 2.3, I describe the data. In 
section 2.4, I introduce the methodologies that I employ in my study. In section 2.5, I 
present and discuss the results. Section 2.6 provides robustness checks. Section 2.7 
concludes.  
 
2.2. Background 
Introduction of the population based Pap smear test has resulted in a sharp decline 
in incidence and mortality rates of cervical cancer. U.S cervical cancer incidence rates 
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decreased by 75%, and the mortality rates declined by 74% in the 50 years following the 
introduction of cervical cytology in 1949 (Saslow et al., 2008). Despite these impressive 
statistics, there is a significant racial and ethnic disparity in cervical cancer incidence and 
its related mortality rates (Reiter et al., 2009). Although these disparities have declined in 
recent years, the incidence rate remains higher among black women (9.6/100,000) in 
comparison with white women (7.9/100,000). Hispanic women also have a higher 
incidence rate (10.9/100,000) than white women. The mortality rate is highest among 
black women (National Cancer Institute, 2014). Cervical cancer mortality rates are higher 
in rural areas of the United States, and factors that place women at higher risk of 
developing cervical cancer are more prevalent in these areas (Brewer and Fazekas, 2007). 
Moreover, some at risk women are less likely to receive screenings. Half of all women 
who are diagnosed with cervical cancer have never been screened, and an additional 10% 
have never been screened in a period of five years before diagnosis (Saslow et al., 2008). 
As a result, any alternative option that can resolve this disparity could be of interest to 
public health policy makers.  
The prevalence of vaccine types HPV declined from 11.5% in 2003-2006 to 5.1% 
in 2007-2010 among females aged 14 through 19 years old. This is despite the fact that 
only 49% of females aged 13-17 had received at least one dose of vaccine, and 32% had 
finished the whole sequence of three doses of vaccine at 2010. Almost all HPV vaccines 
administrated in the United States were the quadrivalent HPV vaccine (Markowitz et al., 
2010). Figure 2.2 shows the national trend of share of girls between 13 to 17 who 
initiated and completed the sequence of the vaccine. The long term effect of the vaccine 
is unknown due to the short time span of implementation. However, some estimates 
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predict the possibility of 70% reduction in cervical cancer rates depending on the number 
of HPV types eventually included in future HPV vaccines and the vaccination 
participation rate (Saslow et al., 2008).  Vaccine programs can potentially most benefit 
those lacking access to routine Pap screening programs. 
There are several reasons that can be outlined for the relatively low vaccination 
rates in the United States. One important barrier to receipt of the vaccine is the cost of the 
vaccine. Depending on health insurance status, parents might have to pay part or all of 
the cost of the vaccine. This can include vaccine administration fees. Another potential 
barrier to vaccine acceptability is lack of motivation by parents to have their daughters 
vaccinated. The lack of interest is mostly derived from concerns about the safety of the 
vaccine and also the perception among parents that HPV is not an imminent risk to their 
daughters’ health. If parents believe that their daughter is not sexually active or the child 
is not of the appropriate age, they might undermine the necessity of vaccination and 
postpone it for the future (Brewer and Fazekas, 2007; Holman, et al., 2014). 
To increase the vaccination rates, within a year after approval of the vaccine, a 
wide vaccine-related legislative activity began in different states. Legislation introduced 
in 41 states and the District of Columbia. It includes bills in 22 states and the District of 
Columbia that would mandate the HPV vaccine for sixth grade girls (Mello et al., 2012)8. 
Figure 2.3 provides an overview of legislative activity at 2006.  Media reports following 
the burst in legislative activity made the claim that the vaccine manufacturer, Merck, was 
heavily involved in promoting school mandates. These reports generated a controversy 
                                                          
8
 It includes California, Connecticut, District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Kansas, Kentucky, 
Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, New Mexico, New York, Ohio, 
Oklahoma, South Carolina, Texas, Vermont, Virginia, and West Virginia. 
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about the degree to which industries should be involved in vaccine policy (Tomljenovic 
& Shaw, 2012).  Since 2006, legislators in at least 45 states and territories have 
introduced legislation with regard to the vaccine and at least 25 states and territories have 
enacted legislation (National Conference of State Legislation, 2013)9. Table 2.1 lists each 
state with a vaccine-related law, the category that the law falls in, along with the year that 
the law became effective and whenever is needed some basic information about the 
legislation is provided. 
The most contentious policy among all the vaccine-related policies is school 
mandates. School mandates make HPV vaccination compulsory for a specific age group, 
mostly sixth grade girls. Many states saw the introduction of at least one school mandate 
bill but in almost all the cases, the bills ultimately failed. On February 2, 2007, Texas 
became the first state that enacted the mandate by executive order; however, almost 
immediately, the legislators passed a bill to override the executive order and the governor 
withheld his veto (National Conference of State Legislation, 2014). By the end of 2011, 
only Washington DC and Virginia had enacted school mandates. However, both states 
offer liberal opt-out actions that allow parents to decline the vaccination for their 
daughters for almost any reason (Stewart, 2008). Multiple attempts by some legislators in 
Virginia to repeal the requirement that school girls be immunized against HPV failed 
(National Conference of State Legislation, 2014). 
There are multiple impediments to the adoption of school mandates. First, school 
mandate bills were introduced only a few months after the vaccine became available in 
                                                          
9
 It includes Colorado, District of Columbia, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, 
Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Nevada, New Mexico, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, North 
Dakota, Oregon, Puerto Rico, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Virginia, and Washington. 
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the market; as a result, many legislators along with public health officials did not support 
the law due to the fact that they believed long-term safety data are needed before 
mandatory vaccination can be justified. Second, the sexually transmitted nature of HPV 
caused some social conservatives to object to a compulsory policy because they believed 
it might lead to reduce the influence of their messages to promote abstinence. Third, there 
was an argument at the time that vaccine mandates were supposed to prevent the spread 
of contagious diseases and school enrollment should not be used to meet other public 
health goals. This argument, coupled with the fact that HPV is not contagious through 
casual contact, created another barrier against adoption of school mandates. The same 
reasoning was used in Virginia to justify the liberal opt-out provision in its legislation. 
Fourth, media coverage of the manufacturer’s aggressive tactics to promote school 
mandates led to the public’s perception that the proposition of these bills is merely due to 
the company’s policy and not the product’s merit, and people who were supportive 
otherwise pulled back. And finally, mandatory vaccination required financial resources in 
order to cover the vaccine’s cost, especially for Medicaid and S-CHIP programs. 
Considering the fact that Gardasil is notably more expensive than other required 
vaccines, HPV vaccine mandates were believed to consume too great a share of states’ 
Medicaid and public health budgets (Colgrove et al., 2010). 
Mandate proposals for the HPV vaccine, like any other compulsory health 
measure, are politically and ethically sensitive because they violate freedom of choice for 
parents. The issue would become even more sensitive when it is realized that HPV 
vaccine intersects with human sexuality (Colgrove et al., 2010). To avoid such 
complications, some states have adopted different regulations than school mandates. One 
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of the most common alternatives to compulsory vaccination is the provision of 
educational content about HPV for parents. Among all the states that proposed school 
mandates, four states eventually adopted such a policy and one adopted a health 
insurance mandate. The remaining states have not adopted any policy. The common 
theme among all of these bills is that they would provide educational content to parents 
about HPV, its link to cervical cancer, and availability of the vaccine as well as potential 
side effects of vaccination. Reference groups subject to this class of policies are different 
in different states, but all these policies are intended to increase vaccination rate through 
increased parental awareness.  There are also states that require health education for 
students to cover the information about HPV, but most of the time the requirements are 
not binding. School districts usually have the authority to decide whether they want to 
include health and sexual education in their curriculum or not. 
In addition to policies that encourage immunization against HPV, coverage of the 
cost of the vaccine is also a crucial factor in the decision to accept the vaccine. A full 
course of HPV vaccination costs about $390, which is significantly more expensive than 
most other required vaccines. Different states offer a wide range of programs to cover the 
cost of the vaccination. One of the oldest programs is federal-state Vaccine for Children 
(VFC) program. VFC took effect in October 1994 and it covers more than 35 million 
children below age of 18. VFC provides recommended vaccines by ACIP, including the 
HPV vaccine at no cost for certain groups. Medicaid eligible children, Alaska native and 
American Indian, and uninsured children are eligible for VFC. The program also provides 
vaccines for underinsured children at Federally Qualified Health Centers (FQHC) and 
Rural Health Clinics. Section 317 of the public health service act is another federal 
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program administrated by CDC, and it provides grants to states and territories, 
commonwealth trusts, and several cities for vaccine purchase and surveillance programs. 
States could only purchase childhood immunization under section 317 prior to enactment 
of the Affordable Care Act (ACA); however, ACA authorizes states to purchase 
recommended vaccines for adults under this section (National Conference of State 
Legislatures, 2011). 
The majority of states rely solely on federal resources to purchase vaccines, but 
some states supplement programs in order to cover a larger target population. State 
Universal Purchasing Programs supplement VFC and section 317 provisions by 
supplying the ACIP-recommended vaccines to privately insured children and adolescents. 
The number of universal states rose by 15 by end of 2000 but since then, ten states have 
changed their status to what is termed “universal select” meaning that they cover all but 
selected vaccines. The high cost of new vaccines was the main obstacle to sustain 
universal purchase programs and there are the vaccines most likely to be omitted in 
“universal select” states. At the beginning of 2008, 7 states had universal programs 
(Alaska, New Hampshire, New Mexico, Rhode Island, Vermont, Washington, and 
Wyoming). Since then, Alaska, Washington, and Wyoming have converted to universal 
select states (Benatar et al., 2010). None of the universal select states provides the HPV 
vaccine for private insurance holders and their supply is limited to VFC eligible children. 
Since the approval of the vaccine, many health insurance policies have stepped forward 
and provided coverage for the HPV vaccine. However, these policies vary significantly in 
terms of cost sharing. During the same period, some states have mandated health 
insurance policies to include the HPV vaccine in their preventive services. These policies 
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also vary greatly with respect to the cost sharing requirements and covered age groups. In 
addition to those states, according to the Affordable Care Act (ACA), new insurances and 
plans as of September 23, 2010 are required to provide preventive services, including 
ACIP-recommended vaccines without imposing out of pocket costs on the policy holder 
such as copayment or coinsurances. 
In the current study, I investigate how two mainly competing policies, school 
mandates and providing educational content for parents, can affect the decision to initiate 
and complete the vaccination. Moreover, I also intend to further examine the effect of 
physician recommendation on the probability of vaccine initiation and completion and to 
compare its effect with the effect of policy variables. Physician recommendation is 
shown to be one of the most important factors in health related decisions (Kenkel & 
Terza, 2001; Kreuter et al., 2000). Receiving advice from a physician with regard the 
vaccine might largely influence the decision to vaccinate. When it comes to social 
welfare, physician recommendation can be very cost-effective due to the fact that it is a 
more targeted intervention and it does not impose much cost on tax payers. 
 
2.3. Data 
The data I use come from National Immunization Survey-Teen (NIS-Teen) from 
2008-2011. This survey collects information about vaccination records of teens between 
13 to 17 years in all 50 states, District of Columbia, and selected area for oversampling. 
The NIS is a list-assisted random-digits-dialing telephone survey followed by a mailed 
survey to the teen’s immunization providers. This is also a period of the time during 
which most states enacted their HPV related regulations. The fact that the data are 
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collected from providers, in addition to the households, increases their reliability. This 
database also collects information whether an individual has ever received a 
recommendation from a physician concerning HPV vaccination.  
I merge the NIS-Teen data to information on the enactment of HPV related regulations in 
different states. I aim to study the effect of school mandates and provision of educational 
content for parents about HPV on both extensive and intensive margins of vaccine 
decisions, as well as physician recommendations.  The latter is also asked of all 
respondents. In addition to the direct effect of these policies on the vaccination decision, 
they can also affect the prevalence of physician recommendation and influence the 
vaccine outcomes indirectly through this channel. As a result, inclusion of the policy 
variables is critical in estimating the effect of physician recommendation. Moreover, it 
provides a baseline to compare the effect of these policies and the effect of physician 
recommendation. School mandates are very similar in wording across states. The content 
of educational packages distributed among parents is very similar in different states as 
well; however, each state has targeted a different age group. I restrict my sample to 
females because mostly just women are subject to these regulations. 
I drop all the states that have enacted educational programs about HPV for 
students and those that have required health insurance plans to include the HPV vaccine 
in their preventive services10. As previously mentioned, educational programs for 
students, most of the time are not binding. As a result, it is almost impossible to 
determine whether or not an individual in the sample had ever received any educational 
content about HPV or not. This impairs the possibility to appropriately control for this 
                                                          
10
 It includes Colorado, Illinois, Iowa, Louisiana, Nevada, New Mexico and Oregon. 
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variable. Health insurance requirements are heterogeneous in terms of cost-sharing 
policies among the states that have adopted such a policy. Coverage of the vaccine may 
be subject to deductibles and coinsurance depending on the choice of health insurance 
plan in some of the states with this policy in effect. It is worth mentioning that cost-
sharing policies among various health insurance plans and different states are very 
different which are unobservable to me. Moreover, many health insurance policies had 
included HPV vaccine in their preventive services shortly after approval of the vaccine 
regardless of legal requirements by states. Consequently, individuals subject to this 
policy might not be significantly different in terms of the exposed vaccination cost with 
residents of other states without a health insurance mandate policy. As a result, it is 
technically impossible to adequately control for this variable. 
In addition to the potential direct effect of educational programs for student and 
health insurance mandates, the vaccination decision might be affected by some 
unobserved channels that are influenced by these policies. For example, HPV awareness 
of those who have not received any information about the disease can still increase 
through discussing it with other families and network externality. While both of these 
policies can affect the vaccination decision, the adoption of these policies is likely to be 
correlated with adoption of school mandates and education for parents programs. 
Moreover, both policies, and more specifically health insurance mandates, can also 
influence the probability of receiving a recommendation from a physician. As a result, 
the disability to control for these variables will lead to biased and inconsistent estimates 
for both policy and physician recommendation variables.  
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As previously mentioned, there are a set of states dubbed “universal states.” These 
states provide ACIP-recommended vaccines for privately insured children, as well as 
VFC eligible ones (Alaska, New Hampshire, New Mexico, Rhode Island, Vermont, 
Washington, and Wyoming). It is reasonable to assume that the cost associated with the 
vaccination in these states is lower in comparison with my treatment group and it might 
affect the vaccination decision. This might undermine the credibility of these states to be 
included in my control group. However, most of these states did not change their status 
over the sample period (New Hampshire, New Mexico, Rhode Island, Vermont, and 
Wyoming) and state dummies can sufficiently control for the effect of universal vaccine 
purchase programs in these states.11 There are also states that have public awareness 
campaigns. These campaigns don’t necessarily target a specific age group or parents only 
(Colorado, North Dakota, and Utah). This policy can encourage vaccination through the 
enhanced public awareness and inclusion of them in the control group might be 
problematic. However, all of these states had this policy in effect the whole sample 
period and, as a result, following the same reasoning as the above, state dummies should 
control for the effect of this policy.12  
My final sample therefore consists of 43 states and District of Columbia over a 4 
year period for a total of 56,004 observations. I merge the state level HPV vaccination 
rates data and the rates of three common sexually transmitted diseases among young 
people 15-24 years of age, estimated by Center for Disease Control and Prevention, and 
                                                          
11
 Alaska changed its status in January 2009, Washington changed it in July 2009, and Wyoming changed it 
in July 2011 to universal select states. 
12
 I initially include all the universal states and the states with a public awareness campaigns, but I 
eventually drop those states that have changed their status to “universal select” during the sample period 
(Alaska, and Washington) and report the results including the remaining states from my control group to 
verify the results. The results are qualitatively the same and will be available upon request. 
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state level cervical cancer prevalence data from National Program of Cancer Registries 
(NPCR) to my database.  
 
2.4. Methodology 
In order to investigate the effect of physician recommendation on vaccine 
decisions, as well as the effect of school mandates and educational programs for parents, 
I begin by estimating: 
1 2
3 4 5
( (age* Year)
( ) ( ) (recom ) )
ijt ijt j t
ijt ijt ijt ijt
Y f X
schman edupar
α β γ δ β
β β β ε
= + + + + +
+ + +
         (1) 
I estimate equation 1 using a probit model. Yijt is a variable that either represents the 
vaccine initiation (dose≥1), or the completion of the vaccine (dose≥3). In some 
specifications, I use a variable that indicates whether a child has been updated for this 
particular vaccine (dose≥1) before the age of 13. This variable allows me to study the 
effect of desired policies on a wider range of age groups. It also provides the opportunity 
to examine the possibility of heterogeneous treatment effects. A decision to get 
vaccinated can be strongly influenced by child’s age due to the sexually transmitted 
nature of the HPV vaccine. I initially use the reported data by providers to construct the 
dependent variable, however, when these data are missing, I use the household reports to 
fill this variable. Failure to obtain provider data is attributable to two main reasons. First, 
the family did not give the consent to contact the teen’s vaccination provider. Second, 
communication with provider was not possible because either contact information for 
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provider was not adequate or the provider did not respond.13 I also utilize the vaccination 
records data after the age of 13 to update the vaccination status before the age of 13. I 
will replace the update status before the age of 13 which are missing by zero, if the 
vaccination records after the age of 13 indicate that a child has not received any dose of 
vaccine. 
The variable schman is a dummy variable indicating that a child lives in a state 
where school mandates for HPV vaccines are in effect and the child has been in the 
covered age group of the legislation at any time after the law was enacted. edupar is a 
dummy variable that indicates those individuals who are in the states in which 
educational content about HPV and its immunization is being distributed among parents, 
and they were in the targeted age group at any time after the law’s enactment. recom is a 
dummy variable indicating whether parents have received a recommendation regarding 
HPV vaccine from a physician or not. γj is a vector of state dummy variables that are 
intended to capture time-invariant factors that cause Y to differ between states. δt is a 
vector of year dummies that captures the difference in Y in different years that are 
common among the states. I also include the interaction of age dummies and year 
dummies to allow Y to vary differently over time by age groups.  
I assume that the imposition of these policies is exogenous. As I discussed earlier, 
most states introduced their regulations shortly after the vaccine was approved. The main 
reason for this outbreak in introduction of the vaccine related bills was the legislative 
efforts by the manufacturer (Tomljenovic & Shaw, 2012). Forty-one states and DC 
                                                          
13
 I also estimated regressions that treat the unavailable vaccination records from the provider as missing, or 
use household data and include a dummy variable that represents when data from provider is missing, and 
Heckman probit model for selection. In all the cases, the results are qualitatively the same. 
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introduced bills with regard to the HPV vaccine in 2006-2007. Twenty-two states and DC 
made efforts to require the HPV vaccine for school enrollment at the same period of time. 
Among twenty-five states and territories that currently have the vaccine related laws in 
effect, twenty-two started their legislative process back in 2006-2007 (National 
Conference of State Legislation, 2013). One might suspect that there are some state-
related factors that affect legislation adoption, the category that the law falls in, as well as 
the vaccination such as degree of conservatism and religiosity. However, geographic 
dispersion of the introduction and the passage of state laws within each category of the 
legislation, as well as the timing of the laws, relieve this concern. It is also worth 
mentioning that I include state and year dummies in my specifications, and these 
unobservable factors are unlikely to change over a course of a four year period. 
Moreover, this burst in the legislative activities only a short time after the approval of the 
vaccine will rule out the possibility that the introduction and passage of these bills was 
due to the general public demand because the awareness about the vaccine in that time 
was limited.  
Xijt is a vector of control covariates. I include controls for age, mother’s marital 
status, mother’s education, mother’s age categories, race, number of children below age 
of 18 in the household, number of people in the household, income, and teen health 
status, and overall health status within the household. It also contains information about 
health insurance status. Health insurance status is divided into three categories. The first 
category is private health insurance policies that might or might not cover the cost of the 
HPV vaccine.  The second is public health insurance that covers the entire cost of the 
vaccination. The third are privately insured but classified as underinsured and receive the 
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full coverage for the vaccination costs through VFC program in this category. The final 
category is military insurance plans that cover the cost of vaccination partially to fully 
depending on the type of the program. I separated military insurance from other 
categories because I am concerned that serving in the military can be associated with 
some unobservable socioeconomic factors that might affect the vaccination decision 
through some other channels rather than simply cost of the vaccine. Moreover, access to 
healthcare is different among different health insurance policy holders. Many physicians 
do not treat publicly insured patients (Currie & Grubber, 1996). Physicians are less 
willing to accept any new Medicaid patients compared with private health insurance 
holders after Affordable Care Act enactment (Decker, 2012). I consider private health 
insurance holders as a reference group, and I only include dummy variables for holding 
public and military health insurance plans. I include two more variables to further control 
for access to healthcare. First, I include a variable that indicates whether there was any 
period of the time after age 11 that a teen did not have any health insurance coverage, 
second, I include a variable that represents whether a child has visited a doctor in the past 
12 months. I also include the rates of one of the most common STDs, Chlamydia, among 
young people 15-24 years of age in each state and year in the regression analysis. I 
include a variable that represents whether a teen has had at least one shot of Tdap 
(tetanus, diphtheria, and pertussis) since age 10 years. Tdap vaccine is recommended for 
preteens at age 11 or 12 years which is the same recommended age range for the HPV 
vaccine. It is likely taking Tdap vaccine influences the decision to initiate the HPV 
vaccine. Table 2.2 presents the definition and coding of the control variables.  
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 It is important to point out that physicians’ advice might be related to some 
unobserved factors that can affect the vaccine related decision outcomes simultaneously. 
This can result in biased and inconsistent estimates. For example, parents who have 
higher value for health might seek to receive a recommendation for their daughters. On 
the other hand, physicians might recommend the vaccine more to those individuals who 
are more probable to get involved in risky behaviors and at the same time tend less to get 
vaccinated.   
The first means to identify plausibly an exogenous variation in the physician 
advice is instrumental variable probit model. This approach requires identifying the 
variables that affect the probability of receiving advice from a physician but are free of 
correlation with factors affecting the vaccine outcomes, conditioned on other covariates. I 
begin with the premise that a chronic condition or any other reason can influence the 
probability of visiting a physician, it can also influence the probability of receiving 
advice for vaccination. If these factors are unrelated to vaccine decisions conditional on 
other observables, they only can explain the variation in the outcomes of interest through 
the variation in physician recommendation and they can be used as plausible instrumental 
variables.  The first instrumental variable I employ is the history of asthma, and the 
second instrumental variable is an indicator for participation in 11-12 year old well child 
exam. Asthma is leading chronic condition among children and adolescents in the United 
States. The National Heart, Lung, and Blood Institute guidelines for the clinical 
management of asthma recommend periodic ambulatory visits for asthma monitoring 
(Akinbami, et al., 2011). Child well-exam is usually required for secondary school 
enrollment and participation in these checkups is not necessarily correlated with the HPV 
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vaccine decision. The high participation rates in the sample can provide an evidence for 
this claim. It is also possible that parents have to take their children to this routine 
checkups in order to update their kids for Tdap boosters. 35 states have Tdap 
requirements for school entry14. It is worth mentioning that I control for Tdap update 
status in my specifications The IV-Probit estimation is summarized by: 
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Z is the vector of instrumental variables and exogenous variables. asthma is the 
history of asthma which is equal to 1 when a child has been diagnosed with asthma at any 
stage in her life and it is 0 otherwise. The second instrumental variable, checkup is a 
dummy variable which is equal to 1 when a child had 11-12 child-well exam. 
 
2.5. Results 
Table 2.3 presents the results from the baseline regression (equation 1) as well as 
IV-probit model as well as the results from the first stage (equation 2). I also report the 
marginal effects of aforementioned variables in Table 2.4. The dependent variable is 
either indicator for vaccine initiation (dose≥1) or vaccine completion (dose≥3) or an 
indicator for whether a child has been updated for the HPV vaccine (dose≥1) before the 
                                                          
14
 It includes Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Florida, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, 
Louisiana, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New 
Mexico, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South 
Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, Wisconsin, and Wyoming 
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age of 13. All the specifications include state and year dummies as well as the interaction 
of age dummies and years.  
Point estimates of the effect of educational programs for parents about HPV for 
parents have the expected positive sign on the vaccine initiation, however, the estimates 
are not statistically significant. The estimated effect of this policy on the decision to 
complete the sequence of the vaccine is positive but it is smaller than the effect the policy 
has on the decision to initiate the vaccine and it is statistically insignificant. The effect is 
very small and highly insignificant when I restrict my dependent variable to the vaccine 
update status before age of 13. This implies that this policy failed to encourage the 
vaccination among the children younger than 13 years old. Parents might be reluctant to 
vaccinate very young children against HPV. This might be derived from sexually 
transmitted nature of HPV vaccine. 
I find the anticipated positive association between the school mandates and 
vaccine initiation among the girls between 13 to 17 years old. The point estimates are 
very close to what I obtained for educational programs for parents, but the coefficients 
are not statistically significant. This perhaps reflects the small number of treatment units 
compared to the whole sample. The point estimates remain positive but statistically 
insignificant when the outcome of interest is decision to complete the sequence of the 
vaccination. The effect of school mandate becomes smaller and remains insignificant 
when I restrict my outcome to the update status prior to age 13, but the coefficients 
remain insignificant at conventional levels. This is somewhat an interesting finding 
considering the fact that school mandates target sixth grade students. Altogether, the 
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estimates in Table 2.3 do not allow me to draw a conclusion that both policies, school 
mandates and educational programs for parents, promote the HPV vaccination.  
Physician recommendation is a strong predictor in all the specifications. 
Receiving advice from a physician can increase the probability of vaccine initiation, and 
vaccine completion. It can also increase the probability of starting the process of the 
vaccination before the age of 13. The strongest effect of physician recommendation is on 
the decision to initiate the vaccination. It is worth mentioning that the full immunization 
consists of three doses of the vaccine in the course of six months. A possible explanation 
for the weaker effect of physician recommendation on vaccine completion compared to 
vaccine initiation is that younger girls may not be currently updated but they are 
scheduled to complete the whole sequence of the vaccine in the future. Moreover, side 
effects from the vaccination might deter the parents from continuing the vaccination. 
Initiation of the vaccine also can decrease the perceived risk of infection resulting in 
declined desired to complete the sequence of the vaccination. On the other hand, the true 
cost of the vaccine for those who don’t have a full coverage for this matter might be 
realized after implementing the first dose, and a result, discourages the completion of the 
vaccine sequence. The point estimates for physician recommendation is larger than any 
of the policy related coefficients and the difference is statistically significant. It indicates 
that receiving advice from a physician can be more effective than any policy in 
promoting the vaccination. As can be seen, estimates that ignore the endogeneity of 
advice can lead to underestimation of the effect of physician advice on the vaccine related 
outcomes. Physician recommendation is still the strongest predictor of the vaccine 
decision and the effect is greater than both policies. Coefficients of school mandate and 
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educational programs for parents follow the same pattern as before even after taking 
physician recommendation into account.  
Note that ρ captures the potential correlation between unobservables that 
determine receipt of advice and vaccination outcomes. In all the models that corrected for 
endogeneity, ρ is negative and statistically significant. This is consistent with the theory 
that physicians recommend the vaccine more to those individuals who are less likely to 
begin the vaccination by their own. It also supports my contention that receive of advice 
should be considered as potentially endogenous variable. 
The results in Table 2.3 indicate that holding public health insurance policies is 
associated with the higher probability of both vaccine initiation and completion compared 
with private health insurance holders. It also increases the relative probability of vaccine 
initiation before the age of 13. The results for military health insurance holders show the 
same pattern. These health insurance policies offer more complete coverage than private 
health insurance policies. Not having a health insurance coverage at some period of time 
since age 11, and not visiting a doctor in the past 12 months is negatively associated with 
all the dependent variables, and in all the specifications.  
Families with 2 children in the household are more likely to accept the vaccine 
compared with single child families. The trend is similar for the families with 3 children 
or more; however, the coefficients are less precise. Increasing the number of children in a 
family can lead to an increase in the likelihood of family’s awareness toward HPV and its 
immunization. For example, if parents were exposed to a vaccine related policy because 
one of their children was in the targeted population of the policy, they might change their 
decision with regard to the vaccination not only for that child but also for the rest of their 
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children as well. Hispanics are more willing to initiate or complete the sequence of the 
HPV vaccination. Mothers with some college experience are more likely to finish the 
entire sequence of the vaccination for their daughters. The estimated coefficients for 
income is surprising. Income is negatively correlated with the vaccine outcomes after the 
age of 13. Lower income can lead to eligibility for governmental subsidies and increase 
the vaccination rate through this channel. Income can also be associated with some other 
socioeconomics factors that tend to decline the vaccination rate. The estimated effect of 
health status has the expected sign; however, the coefficients become less precise for 
vaccine completion and update status before age of 13. It is noteworthy that my measure 
of health status consists of indicators for a wide range of chronic diseases that some of 
them might not necessarily interfere with the vaccination decision15. Household health 
status on the other hand, is positively associated with vaccine outcomes. It is possible that 
those families who have to deal with chronic health conditions might seek preventive 
options for their children in order to protect them.  Tdap update status is a strong, positive 
predictor of the HPV vaccine decisions. As previously mentioned, Tdap is required in 
many states and is recommended over the same age range that HPV vaccine is 
recommended, and one might expect that the decision to take one vaccine can positively 
influence the decision to uptake the other.  
I am returning to a closer look at physician recommendation identifying 
assumption. Both instrumental variables have the expected positive effect on the 
probability of receiving advice from a physician in the first stage estimation. It indicates 
                                                          
15
 I drop the coefficients for the prevalence of Chlamydia in the Tables for lack of space. The estimated 
effect of the prevalence of Chlamydia as one of the most common sexually transmitted disease is very 
small and insignificant. These estimates will be available upon request.  
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that those individuals who need to visit a doctor frequently for asthma conditions or 
visited a physician for an 11-12 child-well exam are more likely to receive a 
recommendation to get vaccinated. As part of a standard procedure, I also report the F 
test from excluded IVs and it indicates that excluded IVs are not weakly identified.  
Using the IV approach necessitates some post estimation diagnostic tests. I am 
required to verify that the IVs are not weak and they are valid, moreover, the IVs should 
not be correlated with error terms. Since some of these post-estimation diagnostic tests 
are not available for IV-Probit model, I use 2SLS for robustness checks and validating 
my instruments. (Angrist, 2000). Table 2.5 presents the results for this alternative for 
robustness checks. The results are qualitatively the same and indicate that the physician 
recommendation is a strong predictor of the vaccination decision. The results of the F test 
from excluded IVs are also reported in Table 2.5. Excluded IVs are jointly significant 
when I control for other explanatory variables in the first stage. It indicates that the 
endogenous variable is not weakly identified. I also use the Hansen test for over-
identification restriction test in my 2SLS framework, the P-Value is large enough to 
conclude the validity of instrumental variables.  
I can generally conclude that the increased awareness of the vaccine resulted from 
the policies or receiving advice from a physician will eventually encourage the vaccine 
initiation and completion. However, parents tend to wait until their daughter gets older. It 
is important to point out that one needs be sexually active in order to be infected by HPV; 
as a result, the perceived risk of infection might not be very high for young girls. This 
might explain why the weakest effects of different variables can be observed among girls 
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younger than 13 years old. It is also critical to consider that school mandates offer a 
liberal opt out provision and the decision to decline the vaccine is not costly for parents. 
These results provide suggestive evidence that the effect of physician 
recommendation is substantially larger than the effect of other policies that aim to 
promote the vaccination. These estimates suggest that policies to encourage physician 
advice about the HPV vaccine to parents are likely to yield substantially more benefits 
than other policies considering the fact that physician recommendation can also be really 
cost-effective. Despite the strong effect of physician recommendation on HPV vaccine 
uptake, many physicians hesitate to recommend the vaccine (Hamlish, et al., 2012). 
There is evidence that physicians are less likely to recommend the vaccine when they are 
male, and uncomfortable discussing human sexuality issues with female patients (Gamble 
et al., 2010). Financial concerns including reimbursement for vaccination, and vaccine 
purchasing costs were cited as some of the most important perceived barriers to 
recommend the vaccine by physicians. Parents’ opposition for moral or religious reasons 
was also perceived as a barrier to recommend the vaccine (Daley et al., 2010). The 
framework used by physicians to convey the message to parents is also very influential in 
the final decision to uptake the vaccine. CDC research shows that the “HPV vaccine is 
cancer prevention” message resonates strongly among parents (Center for Disease 
Control and Prevention, 2013). 
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2.6. Additional Estimates and Robustness Checks 
 
2.6.1. Robustness Checks for the Effect of Physician Recommendation 
It is important to investigate how sensitive the results are to different 
combinations of instrumental variables. First, one might suspect that participation in 11-
12 child-well exam is endogenous. I drop this variable from my exclusion restriction and 
run the regressions including asthma history as the only instrument. Panel A of Table 2.6 
presents the results of these new estimates. The results are firmly consistent with the 
previous findings. 
 I also include a new instrument instead of 11-12 child-well exam. This new 
instrument indicates whether a child missed school more than 30 days in the last year 
because of illness and injury. The HPV vaccine is not recommended for those who are 
currently ill, and it is likely that an exogenous shock in health because of the 
aforementioned reasons might lead to a decline in probability of receiving a 
recommendation by a physician. The results from these new estimates are presented in 
Panel B of Table 2.6. The coefficient of the variable that represents whether a child 
missed more than 30 days in school is negative and less precise than the asthma indicator. 
It implies that these individuals are less likely to receive a recommendation with regard to 
the HPV vaccine compared to those who missed school less than 30 days. As previously 
mentioned, this variable indicates whether a child has missed the school for more than 30 
days because of illness or injury. Loss of school for more than 30 days may represent a 
critical health condition, and a physician may avoid recommending the vaccine in these 
circumstances and leave the vaccination for the future. Moreover, a child might 
experience restriction of mobility in the case of an injury, and these restrictions might 
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decrease the probability of visiting a physician, and as a result, receiving an advice to 
vaccinate against HPV. The physician recommendation remains a strong and positive 
predictor over different ranges of outcome. However, these new estimates do not provide 
any evidence of endogeneity. Correlation coefficient, ρ is very small and statistically 
insignificant in all the specifications but the point estimates remain negative.  On the 
other hand, the F-statistics from excluded IVs decrease significantly in these estimations 
that raise the concern of weak identifications. Overall, these new estimates also indicate 
that physician recommendation is the strongest predictor among all on the HPV vaccine 
decisions16. I also report the marginal effects for the policies and physician 
recommendation in Panel C of Table 2.6. 
 
2.6.2.  Robustness Checks for the Effect of Policies 
Throughout this paper, I find that the effects of both policies on vaccine outcomes 
are very limited. I employ multiple empirical strategies to check the robustness of these 
findings. I drop physician recommendation indicator in these new estimates to avoid 
potential multi-colinearity problem. First, I re-estimate the equation 1 without including 
physician recommendation. Panel A of Table 2.7 presents the results from this new 
identification. The results are qualitatively the same as before and only a modest effect of 
policies on vaccine outcome after age of 13 is observable. Second, School entry 
requirements for HPV vaccine are not strict and they offer a very liberal opt out.  As a 
result, one might expect that school mandates will ultimately affect the vaccine decision 
through the educational content they provide for parents and enhanced parental 
                                                          
16
 I also run 2SLS, and the results are consistent with the IV-Probit framework and all the post-estimation 
diagnostic tests indicate that instruments are valid 
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awareness. I use this unique feature of school entry requirement for HPV vaccine to 
redefine school mandates as a type of educational program for parents. This can 
potentially increase the statistical power of my estimates especially when it comes to the 
effect of increased parental awareness resulted from educational content provided to them 
on decision to complete the entire series of the vaccine. The results if this new regression 
is presented in Panel B of Table 2.7. The results consistently with the previous findings 
indicate at best, a limited effect of the policies on vaccine outcomes for the girls between 
13-17 years old. The coefficients are very small and insignificant for vaccine initiation 
before the age of 13, emphasizing the age sensitivity in parental decision to initiate the 
vaccine.  
In general difference-in-difference requires careful control group selection. 
Finding a sensible control group becomes even more critical when the number of 
observations in the treatment group is very small compared to the entire sample. This 
concern is more pronounced for school mandates because of the fact that this policy has 
been enacted in only Virginia and DC. In order to address this concern, I will follow 
multiple strategies to construct a more comparable control group and ensure the 
robustness of the results.  
First, I restrict my sample to those states that have introduced school mandates at 
some point. These states might share some features that make them more comparable in 
this sense. Moreover, given the controversial nature of this law, people in these states are 
more likely to have been exposed to related news and analysis which can affect the 
parental awareness of the virus and its immunization. Table 2.8 presents the marginal 
effect from this new comparison group. The results follow the same pattern as before, the 
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only modest different is that the estimated coefficient of educational program for parents 
on vaccine initiation becomes larger and statistically significant. Other estimates remain 
statistically insignificant, and consistent with the previous findings, the smallest effect 
can be observed on the decision to initiate the vaccine before age of 13.   
A more systematic approach toward constructing a sensible control group is 
synthetic control method (Abadie et al., 2010). Synthetic control method is a data-driven 
procedure that provides a single control unit as a weighted average of characteristics of 
several potential comparison units. The weights determine the relative contribution of 
each control unit to the counterfactual of interest. Despite the many benefits, this method 
is designed for aggregate level panel data while I am using an individual level repeated 
cross section database. However, Center for Disease Control and Prevention utilizes the 
same individual level database in order to estimate the HPV vaccination rate among girls 
between 13-17 years old. I use the data on vaccination rate along with aggregate state 
level data on different characteristics to build my synthetic group and obtain the weights, 
and then, I use these weights in the basic specification to estimate the effect of school 
mandates. The synthetic control is created by matching on the unemployment rate, 
median income, the relative percentage of Hispanic population, the relative percentage of 
Black population, population density, the percentage of the female population above age 
25 with a bachelor degree or higher, the percentage of the under age 18 population with 
public health insurance plans, and the percentage of married households.  
I only consider Virginia as my treatment state and drop DC from my analysis in 
this section for various reasons. First of all, I am allowed to specify only one treatment 
group in this method. One might consider weighted average characteristics of these two 
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states instead; however, DC is significantly different in terms of different characteristics 
from other states, and as a result, using a weighted average approach might be misleading 
in specifying the synthetic control group. Moreover, Virginia only has enacted school 
mandates while DC has educational program for parents in effect in addition to school 
mandates. Therefore, not all the change in the observed trend of vaccination rate after 
treatment can be attributed to the effect of school mandates. Following the same 
reasoning as before, I drop all the states that have educational programs for students and 
health insurance mandates. Table 2.9 presents the vaccination rate predictor means in 
Virginia and synthetic Virginia. Table 2.10 presents state weights in Synthetic Virginia. 
The weights indicate that vaccination rate trends in Virginia prior to enactment of school 
mandate is best reproduced by a combination of Alaska, Hawaii, Maryland, North 
Dakota, South Carolina, and Utah. 
The synthetic control method relies heavily on pre-treatment observations in order 
to match the pre-treatment trends between groups, and the fact that I only have one pre-
treatment period might cause some concerns about the validity of the results. Considering 
the fact that Maryland has obtained the highest weight among all the potential control 
units, however, can reduce this concern. Maryland is Virginia’s neighbor and is expected 
to share many characteristics with Virginia, including that it once introduced school 
mandates. The marginal effects from synthetic control method for both probit and linear 
probability model are presented in Table 2.11. These results also indicate that school 
mandates did not promote the vaccination on different margins. 
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2.6.3. Difference-in-Difference-in-Difference  
In each year, a new age group is subject to school mandates. As a result, an 
alternative to the basic specification to identify the effect of school mandates is 
Difference-in-Difference-in-Difference. In this method, I use both a different state and a 
control group in the treatment states that were not affected by this policy as my control 
group. The DDD starts with the time change in averages between the treatment group in 
the states with the policy in effect and then nets out the change in means for treatment 
group in control states and non-treatment group in the treatment stat (Imbens & 
Wooldridge, 2007). I use Virginia as my treatment state to construct the DDD 
framework. Unlike DC that has enacted both school mandate and educational program 
for parents, Virginia only has school mandate in effect. I drop all the states that have 
educational programs for parents, including DC, to obtain a clear control group for this 
framework. This estimation is summarized by: 
 
1 2 3
4 5 6
( (schman ) (treat * after )
( * after ) ( * ) ( * * ) )
ijt it j t i j t
i t i j i t j ijt
Y f X
schman schman treat schman after treat
α β γ δ β β
β β β ε
= + + + + + +
+ + +
   (4) 
The variable schman is a dummy for treatment group which is one when an individual is 
in the age range group that was targeted by this policy and zero otherwise. after is a 
dummy variable that is equal to one if it is after the law’s enactment and zero otherwise. 
treat indicates treatment state which is Virginia in this case. 
 
Β2 controls for the time 
invariant characteristics of the treatment group. β3 controls for the change over time in 
treatment state. 
 
Β4 controls for the change over time in the treatment group for the entire 
states in the analysis. Β5 captures the time invariant characteristics of treatment group in 
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the treatment state. And finally, β6 is the coefficient of interest and captures the variation 
in vaccine outcomes specific to the treatment groups relative to two control groups before 
and after the law (Gruber, 1994).  
Table 2.12 presents the marginal effects of the DDD estimation. The results 
indicate that the treatment group is less likely to initiate or complete the vaccination 
compared to others when the outcome of interest is vaccination outcomes after the age of 
13, it is consistent with the findings before that implied age is positively related with the 
vaccine decision outcomes. The point estimate of being in the treatment group on the 
update status before age of 13 is positive and significant.  It is also consistent with the 
previous findings that increasing age will reduce the probability of being updated before 
the age of 13. Additionally, the treatment group is less likely to initiate and complete the 
vaccination compared to others after the law’s enactment. The results derived from this 
regression do not allow me to draw a strong conclusion about the effect of school 
mandates. The point estimates are positive, but they are not statistically significant at the 
conventional level. It again might reflect the limited number of treatment units.  
 
2.7. Conclusion  
I provide the first national study of the effect of school mandates and provision of 
educational content for parents imposed by states on the HPV vaccine initiation and 
completion. HPV is responsible for 70% of cervical cancers and is considered a major 
public health issue. I focus on the effect of policies on the vaccine decision on extensive 
and intensive margins and over different age ranges. I also study the effect of physician 
recommendation with regard to the vaccine on the vaccine decisions. My results suggest 
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that the effect of policies on the vaccine decision is at best limited. Policies also failed to 
encourage the vaccination for girls younger than 13 years old indicating that the decision 
to initiate the vaccine is age sensitive. 
Physician recommendation is found to be a strong predictor of the vaccine related 
decision, with the strongest effect observed on the decision to initiate the vaccine, 
providing parents with written and verbal reminders, and scheduling follow up visits at 
the time of initial vaccination could increase vaccine compliance (Neubrand et al., 2009).  
The same strategies can be employed to increase the HPV vaccine completion rate. The 
results also indicate that physician advice is substantially more successful in promoting 
the vaccine than both school mandates and educational programs for parents. With 
evidence that physician advice encourages the vaccination, a prevalence of advice 
becomes a matter of policy concern. Considering the fact that Tdap booster is 
recommended for the same age range as the HPV vaccine, and taking into account that 
parents are less sensitive about Tdap shots, there is an opportunity for physicians to 
recommend the HPV vaccine at the time of Tdap vaccine uptake. 
The welfare implications and cost-benefit analysis of any of these policies need to 
be explored more. In addition to the direct effect of this vaccine on declining the rate of 
HPV infection, and potentially cervical cancer, there are also negative and positive 
externalities involved.   If these policies can convince parents to take their children to a 
physician or a clinic in order to get the HPV vaccine, it also will increase the probability 
of receiving other vaccines, and as a result, increase the immunization rates for a range of 
disease. Countering the effectiveness of the vaccine, there is the potential that 
vaccinations may lead to increased risky behavior. Numerous academic studies on 
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vaccinations provide a behavioral framework in vaccination models of sexually 
transmitted diseases, and predict that an imperfect vaccination might result in an increase 
in sexual activity of high risk populations, and as a result, increase the spread of the 
disease (Kremer, 1996). Some newly presented results show that the HPV vaccine can 
increase the sexual activity in low income adolescents (Hill, 2013).  
Policy makers also need to consider the parental sensitivity towards the 
vaccination age. Given the fact that parents are unwilling to begin the vaccination for the 
children aged less than 13, targeting this age group coupled with a liberal opt out 
provision will result in an ineffective policy. The cost of the vaccine is also an important 
determinant in the decision to accept the vaccine. The ACA is possibly a way to solve 
this issue.  
The Pap smear screening test is shown to be very effective in reducing the 
cervical cancer incidence and mortality rates. If the vaccine declines the participation rate 
in this program due to the false risk perception, it can have a significant welfare 
implication. Therefore, it is critical to investigate the effect of the vaccine acceptance on 
participation in Pap smear screening programs among adults. This can be subject of 
future research.  
  
72 
 
 
2.9. References  
1- Abadie, A., Diamond, A., Hainmueller, J., National Bureau of Economic Research. 
(2007). Synthetic Control Methods for Comparative Case Studies: Estimating the 
Effect of California's Tobacco Control program. Cambridge, Mass: National Bureau 
of Economic Research. 
2- Akinbami, L. J., Moorman, J. E., Liu, X., & National Center for Health Statistics 
(U.S.). (2011). Asthma Prevalence, Health Care Use, and Mortality: United States, 
2005-2009. Hyattsville, MD: U.S. Dept. of Health and Human Services, Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention, National Center for Health Statistics. 
3- Angrist, J. D., National Bureau of Economic Research. (2000). Estimation of 
Limited-Dependent Variable Models with Dummy Endogenous Regressors: Simple 
Strategies for Empirical Practice. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic 
Research. 
4- Benatar, S., Howell, E., Bovbjerg, R. (2010). Universal Purchasing of Childhood 
Vaccine in New York State: A Feasibility Assessment. Final Report to the New York 
State Department of Health, Health Policy Center, The Urban Institute  
5- Black, L. L., Zimet, G. D., Short, M. B., Sturm, L., & Rosenthal, S. L. (2009). 
Literature Review of Human Papillomavirus Vaccine Acceptability among Women 
over 26 Years. Vaccine, 27, 11, 1668-1673. 
6- Brewer, N. T., & Fazekas, K. I. (2007). Predictors of HPV Vaccine Acceptability: A 
Theory-Informed, Systematic Review. Preventive Medicine, 45, 107-114. 
7- Bugenske, E., Stokley, S., Kennedy, A., & Dorell, C. (2012). Middle School 
Vaccination Requirements and Adolescent Vaccination Coverage. Pediatrics, 129, 6, 
1056-63. 
8- Center for Disease Control and Prevention. (2013). You are the key to HPV cancer 
prevention: understanding the burden of HPV disease and importance of the HPV 
vaccine recommendation 
9- Center for Disease Control and Prevention. (2014). Human Papillomavirus (HPV). 
Retrieved from http://www.cdc.gov/std/hpv/ 
10- Center for Disease Control and Prevention. (2014). Vaccine Safety, Human 
Papillomavirus (HPV) Vaccine. Retrieved from 
http://www.cdc.gov/vaccinesafety/vaccines/HPV/index.html  
11- Colgrove, J., Abiola, S., & Mello, M. M. (2010). HPV Vaccination Mandates-
Lawmaking amid Political and Scientific Controversy. The New England Journal of 
Medicine, 363, 8, 785-91. 
12- Currie, J., & Gruber, J. (1996). Health Insurance Eligibility, Utilization of Medical 
Care, and Child Health. Quarterly Journal of Economics Cambridge Massachusetts-
, 111, 2, 431-466. 
73 
 
 
13- Daley, M. F., Crane, L. A., Markowitz, L. E., Black, S. R., Beaty, B. L., Barrow, J., 
Babbel, C., Kempe, A. (2010). Human Papillomavirus Vaccination Practices: A 
Survey of US Physicians 18 Months after Licensure. Pediatrics, 126, 3, 425-33. 
14- Decker, S. L. (2012). In 2011 Nearly One-Third of Physicians said They Would not 
Accept New Medicaid Patients, but Rising Fees may Help. Health Affairs (project 
Hope), 31, 8, 1673-9. 
15- Gruber, J. (1994). The Incidence of Mandated Maternity Benefits. The American 
Economic Review (Evanston), 84, 3, 622-641. 
16-  Gamble, Heather L, Klosky, James L, Parra, Gilbert R, & Randolph, Mary E. 
(2010).Factors Influencing Familial Decision-Making Regarding Human 
Papillomavirus Vaccination. Oxford University Press. 
17- Hamlish, T., Clarke, L., & Alexander, K. A. (2012). Barriers to HPV Immunization 
for African American Adolescent Females. Vaccine, 30, 45, 6472-6. 
18- Hill, A. (2014). Medical Innovation and Moral Hazard: The Effect of HPV Vaccine 
on risky Sexual Behavior. Working Paper 
19- Holman, D. M., Benard, V., Roland, K. B., Watson, M., Liddon, N., & Stokley, S. 
(2014). Barriers to Human Papillomavirus Vaccination among US Adolescents: A 
Systematic Review of the Literature. Jama Pediatrics, 168, 1, 76-82. 
20- Imbens, G., Wooldridge, J. (2007). What’s New in Economterics? Difference-in-
Difference Estimation. NBER 
21- Jain, N., Euler, G. L., Shefer, A., Lu, P., Yankey, D., & Markowitz, L. (2009). 
Human Papillomavirus (HPV) Awareness and Vaccination Initiation among Women 
in the United States, National Immunization Survey-Adult 2007. Preventive 
Medicine, 48, 5, 426-431. 
22- Kenkel, D. S., & Terza, J. V. (2001). The Effect of Physician Advice on alcohol 
Consumption: Count Regression with an Endogenous Treatment Effect. Journal of 
Applied Econometrics, 16, 2, 165-184. 
23- Kremer, M., & National Bureau of Economic Research. (1996). Integrating 
Behavioral Choice into Epidemiological Models of AIDS. Cambridge, MA: National 
Bureau of Economic Research. 
24- Kreuter, M. W., Chheda, S. G., & Bull, F. C. (2000). How Does Physician Advice 
Influence Patient Behavior? Evidence for a Priming Effect. Archives of Family 
Medicine, 9, 5, 426-33. 
25- Laz, T. H., Rahman, M., & Berenson, A. B. (2012). An Update on Human 
Papillomavirus Vaccine Uptake among 11-17 Year Old Girls in the United States: 
National Health Interview Survey, 2010. Vaccine, 30, 24, 3534-40. 
26- Markowitz, L. E., Hariri, S., Lin, C., Dunne, E. F., Steinau, M., McQuillan, G., & 
Unger, E. R. (2013). Reduction in Human Papillomavirus (HPV) Prevalence among 
Young Women Following HPV Vaccine Introduction in the United States, National 
74 
 
 
Health and Nutrition Examination Surveys, 2003-2010. The Journal of Infectious 
Diseases, 208, 3, 385-93. 
27- Mello, M. M., Abiola, S., & Colgrove, J. (2012). Pharmaceutical Companies' Role in 
State Vaccination Policymaking: the Case of Human Papillomavirus Vaccination. 
American Journal of Public Health, 102, 5, 893-8. 
28- National Cancer Institute. (2014). SEER Stat Fact Sheet: Cervix Uteri Cancer. 
Retrieved from http://seer.cancer.gov/statfacts/html/cervix.html 
29- National Conference of State Legislatures. (2014). HPV Vaccine Policies. Retrieved 
from http://www.ncsl.org/research/health/hpv-vaccine-state-legislation-and-
statutes.aspx 
30- National Conference of State Legislatures. (2011). Immunization Policy Issues 
Overview. Retrieved from http://www.ncsl.org/research/health/immunizations-policy-
issues-overview.aspx 
31- Neubrand, T. P., Breitkopf, C. R., Rupp, R., Breitkopf, D., & Rosenthal, S. L. (2009). 
Factors Associated with Completion of the Human Papillomavirus Vaccine Series. 
Clinical Pediatrics, 48, 9, 966-9. 
32- Reiter, P. L., Brewer, N. T., Gottlieb, S. L., McRee, A. L., & Smith, J. S. (2009). 
Parents' Health Beliefs and HPV Vaccination of Their Adolescent Daughters. Social 
Science & Medicine, 69, 3, 475-480. 
33- Roblin, D. W., Chang, A., Roblin, D. W., Ritzwoller, D. P., Carroll, N. M., Daley, M. 
F., & Rees, D. I. (2014). The Influence of Deductible Health Plans on Receipt of the 
Human Papillomavirus Vaccine Series. Journal of Adolescent Health, 54, 3, 275-281. 
34- Rosenthal, S. L., Weiss, T. W., Zimet, G. D., Ma, L., Good, M. B., & Vichnin, M. D. 
(2011). Predictors of HPV Vaccine Uptake among Women aged 19-26: Importance of 
a physician's recommendation. Vaccine, 29, 5, 890-895. 
35- Saslow, D., Castle, P. E., Cox, J. T., Davey, D. D., Einstein, M. H., Ferris, D. G., 
Goldie, S. J., ... Garcia, F. (2007). American Cancer Society Guideline for Human 
Papillomavirus (HPV) Vaccine Use to Prevent Cervical Cancer and Its 
Precursors. Ca: a Cancer Journal for Clinicians, 57, 1, 7-28. 
36- Stewart, Alexandra. (2008). CHILDHOOD VACCINE AND SCHOOL ENTRY 
LAWS: THE CASE OF HPV VACCINE. Association of Schools of Public Health. 
37- Tomljenovic, L., & Shaw, C. A. (2012). Too Fast or not Too fast: the FDA's 
Approval of Merck's HPV Vaccine Gardasil. The Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics 
: a Journal of the American Society of Law, Medicine & Ethics, 40, 3, 673-81. 
38- Ylitalo, K. R., Lee, H., & Mehta, N. K. (2013). Health Care Provider 
Recommendation, Human Papillomavirus Vaccination, and Race/Ethnicity in the US 
National Immunization Survey. American Journal of Public Health, 103, 1, 164-9. 
  
75 
 
 
 
Figure 2.1. Number of states in each category of HPV vaccine related legislation 
 
Figure 2.2. Share of 13-17 years old girls who initiated and completed the sequence of the HPV vaccine 
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Figure 2.3. An overview of the HPV related legislative activity at 2006 
A. States that introduced HPV vaccine related legislation at 2006 
 
B. States that introduced school mandates at 2006 
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Table 2.1. HPV Related Legislation  
State Category Covered Group 
Explanation  Effective date 
Colorado 
Awareness Campaign All  2008 
Health Insurance Mandate All 2008 
Education for Students Not Specified 2008 
     
DC School Mandate 11-12  2009 
 Education for Parents All  2009 
     
Illinois  Education for Parents 11-12  2007 Education for Students 11-12  2007 
Indiana Education for Parents 11-12  2008 
     
Iowa Education for Students 13-14  2007 Health Insurance Mandate All  2009 
     
Kansas Other NA 
Would urge FDA to be more 
cautious in approving new 
vaccines 
2009 
Louisiana Education for Students All  2008 
Maine Other All Consideration for future funding  
     
Maryland Other NA 
Establish a task force to provide 
a recommendation for the state 
plan for vaccine 
2007 
Michigan Education for Parents All  2008 
     
Minnesota  Other NA Study on different aspect of HPV 
vaccine 2007 
Missouri Education for Parents All  2010 
Nevada Health Insurance Mandate All  2007 
New Jersey Education for Parents All  2007 
New Mexico Health Insurance Mandate 9-14  2007 
     
New York Other All 
Allocate 5,000,000 for services 
and expenses to promote and 
expand the access to cervical 
cancer vaccine.  
Fiscal year 
2007-2008 
North 
Carolina Education for Parents All 
 2007 
North Dakota  Awareness Campaign All  2007 
Oregon Health Insurance Mandate All  2010 
South Dakota Other 11-19 Cover the cost of the vaccine Fiscal year 2007-2008 
     
Texas Education for Parents All  2007 
Utah Awareness Campaign All  2007 
Virginia School Mandate 11-12  2009 
Washington Education for Parents 11-12  2007 
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Table 2.2. Definition of Control Variables 
Variable Coding 
Age =Child’s age 
Number of children 
categories   
2 children =1 if the number of children below age of 18 in the household is 2. 
3 or more children =1 if the number of children below age of 18 in the household is 3 or more. 
Mother’s age categories  
Mother below 34 =1 if mother’s age is below 34  
Mother below 44 
and above 34 =1  if mother’s age is below 44 and above 34 
Race/Ethnicity   
Hispanic =1 if the child is Hispanic 
Black  =1 if the child is Black  
Income  =1 if the household annual income is above 20,000$ 
Mother’s marital status =1 if mother is currently married 
Mother’s education =1 if mother has 13 years of education or more 
People in the household =Number of people in the household 
Health insurance status  
Private  =1 if person holds employer or union provided health insurance. 
Public =1 if person Medicaid, S-CHIP, or American-Indian health insurance. 
Military =1 if person holds TRICARE, CHAMPUS, or CHAMPUS-VA. 
No Insurance Since 11 =1 if there is any period of the time after age 11 that teen did not have any health insurance coverage 
No doctor visit last year =1 if person has not visited a doctor in the past 12 months 
Teen health status 
=1 if teen has already lung condition rather than asthma, heart condition, 
diabetes, a kidney condition, sick cell anemia or other anemia, weakened 
immune system because of chronic illness or caused by medicine taken by 
chronic illness 
Household health status 
=1 if any other members of teen’s household have lung condition rather 
than asthma, heart condition, diabetes, a kidney condition, sick cell anemia 
or other anemia, weakened immune system because of chronic illness or 
caused by medicine taken by chronic illness 
Prevalence of 
Chlamydia 
Number of diagnosed patients between 15-24 years old per every person in 
that age range. 
Tdap update status =1 if teen has had at least one shot of Tdap since age 10 years 
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Table 2.3. Effect of Physician Recommendation on Vaccine Outcomes-Probit Model 
 Vaccine Initiation  Vaccine Completion  Update before Age 13 
VARIABLES (1)  (2)  (3) 
      
Age 0.0853***  0.0850***  -0.868*** 
 (0.0119)  (0.0133)  (0.0757) 
Public insurance 0.230***  0.148***  0.256*** 
 (0.0223)  (0.0230)  (0.0279) 
Military insurance 0.140***  0.0213  0.0804* 
 (0.0349)  (0.0364)  (0.0441) 
No insurance since 11 -0.117***  -0.214***  -0.174*** 
 (0.0305)  (0.0331)  (0.0416) 
No doctor visit last year -0.250***  -0.145***  -0.0688** 
 (0.0237)  (0.0251)  (0.0306) 
2 children 0.0532***  0.0238  0.0224 
 (0.0198)  (0.0204)  (0.0267) 
3 or more children 0.0241  0.00530  0.00792 
 (0.0414)  (0.0435)  (0.0534) 
Mom’s age below 34 0.0994***  -0.0567  0.102** 
 (0.0346)  (0.0367)  (0.0402) 
Mom below 44 and above 
34 
-0.0212 
(0.0175) 
 -0.0592*** 
(0.0181) 
 0.0519** 
(0.0231) 
Number of people in the 
household 
-0.0267*** 
(0.00910) 
 -0.0412*** 
(0.00952) 
 -0.0291** 
(0.0122) 
Income -0.157***  -0.0732**  -0.0211 
 (0.0298)  (0.0312)  (0.0370) 
Hispanic  0.206***  0.0992***  0.189*** 
 (0.0288)  (0.0293)  (0.0347) 
Black 0.00980  -0.163***  0.0160 
 (0.0290)  (0.0312)  (0.0387) 
Currently married -0.0637***  -0.0336  -0.0299 
 (0.0200)  (0.0210)  (0.0271) 
College  -0.0587***  0.0257  -0.0385 
 (0.0196)  (0.0204)  (0.0256) 
Teen health status -0.118***  -0.0644  -0.0318 
 (0.0393)  (0.0412)  (0.0533) 
Household health status 0.0641***  0.0313*  0.0641*** 
 (0.0163)  (0.0169)  (0.0214) 
TDAP booster update 0.521***  0.408***  0.502*** 
 (0.0174)  (0.0183)  (0.0261) 
School mandate 0.0993  0.119  0.0809 
 (0.108)  (0.113)  (0.120) 
Education for parents 0.0610  0.00674  -0.0607 
 (0.0559)  (0.0586)  (0.0809) 
Physician recommendation  0.847***  0.660***  0.572*** 
 (0.0162)  (0.0172)  (0.0225) 
Constant -1.842***  -2.143***  10.28*** 
 (0.229)  (0.250)  (1.030) 
Observations 30,376  30,376  30,376 
Note: Regressions include state and year fixed effects as well as the interactions of age and year. The 
numbers in parenthesis are robust standard errors. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 2.3. Effect of Physician Recommendation on Vaccine Outcomes-IV-Probit Model (Continued) 
 Vaccine Initiation  Vaccine Completion  Update before Age 13 
 IV-Probit Stage 1  IV-Probit Stage 1   IV-Probit Stage 1 
VARIABLES (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6) 
         
Age 0.0854*** -0.0214  0.0860*** -0.0201  -0.846*** -0.0186 
 (0.0118) (0.0134)  (0.0133) (0.0134)  (0.0748) (0.0134) 
Public insurance 0.233*** -0.0900***  0.151*** -0.0897***  0.260*** -0.0895*** 
 (0.0223) (0.0234)  (0.0231) (0.0234)  (0.0278) (0.0234) 
Military insurance 0.143*** -0.0753**  0.0241 -0.0766**  0.0850* -0.0762** 
 (0.0350) (0.0367)  (0.0364) (0.0367)  (0.0440) (0.0366) 
No insurance since 11 -0.113*** -0.0426  -0.210*** -0.0424  -0.165*** -0.0428 
 (0.0306) (0.0315)  (0.0332) (0.0315)  (0.0414) (0.0315) 
No doctor visit  -0.234*** -0.257***  -0.131*** -0.259***  -0.0415 -0.256*** 
 (0.0241) (0.0266)  (0.0254) (0.0266)  (0.0308) (0.0265) 
2 children 0.0479** 0.0965***  0.0189 0.0963***  0.0127 0.0955*** 
 (0.0198) (0.0207)  (0.0204) (0.0207)  (0.0266) (0.0207) 
3 or more children 0.0223 0.0343  0.00379 0.0340  0.00460 0.0344 
 (0.0413) (0.0436)  (0.0435) (0.0436)  (0.0531) (0.0436) 
Mom below 34 0.0970*** 0.0551  -0.0594 0.0556  0.0962** 0.0518 
 (0.0347) (0.0377)  (0.0368) (0.0377)  (0.0402) (0.0377) 
Mom below 44 and 
above 34 
-0.0229 
(0.0175) 
0.0207 
(0.0186) 
 -0.0606*** 
(0.0181) 
0.0204 
(0.0186) 
 0.0468** 
(0.0230) 
0.0207 
(0.0185) 
Number of people in 
the household 
-0.0255*** 
(0.00910) 
-0.0188** 
(0.00953) 
 -0.0400*** 
(0.00953) 
-0.0189** 
(0.00954) 
 -0.0268** 
(0.0121) 
-0.0189** 
(0.00953) 
Income -0.164*** 0.150***  -0.0806** 0.151***  -0.0356 0.151*** 
 (0.0300) (0.0307)  (0.0313) (0.0307)  (0.0368) (0.0307) 
Hispanic  0.209*** -0.0849***  0.102*** -0.0844***  0.192*** -0.0851*** 
 (0.0289) (0.0299)  (0.0294) (0.0299)  (0.0345) (0.0299) 
Black 0.0188 -0.194***  -0.153*** -0.194***  0.0349 -0.193*** 
 (0.0291) (0.0297)  (0.0313) (0.0297)  (0.0386) (0.0297) 
Currently married -0.0629*** -0.0112  -0.0329 -0.0118  -0.0287 -0.0101 
 (0.0200) (0.0210)  (0.0210) (0.0210)  (0.0269) (0.0210) 
College  -0.0710*** 0.223***  0.0136 0.223***  -0.0607** 0.224*** 
 (0.0198) (0.0203)  (0.0207) (0.0203)  (0.0257) (0.0203) 
Teen health status -0.120*** 0.0619  -0.0660 0.0619  -0.0308 0.0623 
 (0.0392) (0.0408)  (0.0411) (0.0409)  (0.0527) (0.0408) 
Household health 
status 
0.0627*** 0.00333  0.0301* 0.00353  0.0604*** 0.00321 
 (0.0163) (0.0174)  (0.0169) (0.0174)  (0.0213) (0.0174) 
TDAP booster update 0.501*** 0.315***  0.389*** 0.317***  0.461*** 0.314*** 
 (0.0182) (0.0181)  (0.0191) (0.0181)  (0.0267) (0.0181) 
School mandate 0.109 -0.158  0.130 -0.156  0.0987 -0.172 
 (0.108) (0.127)  (0.113) (0.127)  (0.120) (0.127) 
Education for parents 0.0599 0.0743  0.00621 0.0742  -0.0596 0.0746 
 (0.0558) (0.0601)  (0.0585) (0.0601)  (0.0803) (0.0601) 
Excluded IVs         
Asthma   0.0990***   0.0984***   0.0996*** 
  (0.0215)   (0.0215)   (0.0214) 
Checkup 11-12  0.403***   0.404***   0.405*** 
  (0.0295)   (0.0296)   (0.0292) 
F-Statistics  105.05***   104.75***   108.02*** 
ρ  
 -0.103***   -0.101***   -0.221*** 
  (0.0261)   (0.0270)   (0.0321) 
Physician 
recommendation  
0.985***   0.797***   0.832***  
 (0.0373)   (0.0394)   (0.0418)  
Observations 30,376 30,376  30,376 30,376  30,376 30,376 
Note: Regressions include state and year fixed effects as well as the interactions of age and year. The numbers in 
parenthesis are robust standard errors. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 2.4. Marginal Effects of Physician Recommendation 
 Vaccine Initiation  Vaccine Completion  Update before Age 13 
 Probit IV-Probit  Probit IV-Probit  Probit IV-Probit 
VARIABLES (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6) 
         
School mandate 0.0395 0.0436  0.0413 0.0451  0.00959 0.0124 
 (0.0431) (0.0432)  (0.0402) (0.0405)  (0.0152) (0.0163) 
Education for Parents 0.0242 0.0238  0.00226 0.00208  -0.00656 -0.00672 
 (0.0222) (0.0222)  (0.0197) (0.0197)  (0.00846) (0.00877) 
Physician 
recommendation 
0.323*** 
(0.00576) 
0.371*** 
(0.0128) 
 0.212*** 
(0.00517) 
0.253*** 
(0.0117) 
 0.0603*** 
(0.00377) 
0.0904*** 
(0.00694) 
   
Observations 30,376 30,376  30,376 30,376  30,376 30,376 
Note: Regressions include state and year fixed effects as well as the interactions of age and year. The numbers 
in parenthesis are robust standard errors. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 2.5. Linear Probability Model-OLS 
 Vaccine Initiation  Vaccine Completion  Update before Age 13 
VARIABLES (1)  (2)  (3) 
      
Age 0.0273***  0.0217***  -0.0421*** 
 (0.00378)  (0.00331)  (0.00242) 
Public insurance 0.0757***  0.0413***  0.0497*** 
 (0.00747)  (0.00708)  (0.00564) 
Military insurance 0.0463***  0.00332  0.0167* 
 (0.0118)  (0.0113)  (0.00890) 
No insurance since 11 -0.0364***  -0.0594***  -0.0291*** 
 (0.00993)  (0.00906)  (0.00699) 
No doctor visit last year -0.0786***  -0.0370***  -0.00959* 
 (0.00747)  (0.00687)  (0.00564) 
2 children 0.0175***  0.00675  0.00423 
 (0.00661)  (0.00636)  (0.00478) 
3 children or more 0.00852  0.00314  -0.000980 
 (0.0137)  (0.0129)  (0.0104) 
Mom’s age below 34 0.0335***  -0.0155  0.0275*** 
 (0.0115)  (0.0107)  (0.00982) 
Mom’s age below 44 
and above 34 
-0.00715  -0.0181***  0.00927** 
 (0.00587)  (0.00555)  (0.00435) 
Number of people in the 
household 
-0.00875*** 
(0.00303) 
 -0.0123*** 
(0.00287) 
 -0.00500** 
(0.00219) 
Income  -0.0527***  -0.0220**  -0.00313 
 (0.00995)  (0.00956)  (0.00775) 
Hispanic  0.0695***  0.0299***  0.0461*** 
 (0.00972)  (0.00942)  (0.00762) 
Black  0.00349  -0.0458***  0.00453 
 (0.00955)  (0.00884)  (0.00709) 
Currently married -0.0215***  -0.00961  -0.00850* 
 (0.00666)  (0.00635)  (0.00494) 
College  -0.0198***  0.00795  -0.00788* 
 (0.00646)  (0.00608)  (0.00473) 
Teen health status  -0.0396***  -0.0208*  -0.00836 
 (0.0132)  (0.0126)  (0.00958) 
Household health status  0.0211***  0.00876*  0.0125*** 
 (0.00547)  (0.00524)  (0.00407) 
TDAP booster update 0.176***  0.119***  0.0808*** 
 (0.00586)  (0.00544)  (0.00383) 
School mandate  0.0346  0.0349  0.0268 
 (0.0376)  (0.0364)  (0.0355) 
Education for parents 0.0213  -0.000574  -0.00813 
 (0.0186)  (0.0174)  (0.0143) 
Physician 
recommendation 
0.298*** 
(0.00547) 
 0.198*** 
(0.00504) 
 0.103*** 
(0.00391) 
Observations 30,376  30,376  30,376 
Note: Regressions include state and year fixed effects as well as the interactions of age and year. The numbers in 
parenthesis are robust standard errors. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 2.5. Linear Probability Model-2SLS-(Continued) 
 Vaccine 
Initiation 
 Vaccine Completion  Update before 
Age 13 
 Stage 1 
VARIABLES (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
        
Age 0.0180***  0.0223***  -0.0316***  -0.00709 
 (0.00501)  (0.00471)  (0.00310)  (0.00494) 
Public insurance 0.0878***  0.0554***  0.0539***  -0.0324*** 
 (0.00953)  (0.00923)  (0.00661)  (0.00872) 
Military insurance 0.0552***  0.00645  0.0167  -0.0279** 
 (0.0148)  (0.0143)  (0.0102)  (0.0137) 
No insurance since 11 -0.0325***  -0.0573***  -0.0246***  -0.0156 
 (0.0126)  (0.0120)  (0.00837)  (0.0118) 
No doctor visit last year -0.0238*  0.0123  0.0311***  -0.0967*** 
 (0.0131)  (0.0122)  (0.00864)  (0.00996) 
2 children 0.00525  -0.00708  -0.00682  0.0347*** 
 (0.00836)  (0.00819)  (0.00569)  (0.00750) 
3 children or more 0.00447  -0.00349  -0.00574  0.0115 
 (0.0169)  (0.0164)  (0.0120)  (0.0161) 
Mom’s age below 34 0.0125  -0.0322**  0.0107  0.0208 
 (0.0148)  (0.0143)  (0.0115)  (0.0140) 
Mom’s age below 44 
and above 34 
-0.0126*  -0.0241***  0.00579  0.00744 
 (0.00722)  (0.00697)  (0.00499)  (0.00673) 
Number of people in the 
household 
-0.00563 
(0.00373) 
 -0.00988*** 
(0.00367) 
 -0.00207 
(0.00255) 
 -0.00680* 
(0.00349) 
Income  -0.0708***  -0.0384***  -0.00990  0.0569*** 
 (0.0130)  (0.0127)  (0.00917)  (0.0116) 
Hispanic  0.0789***  0.0408***  0.0467***  -0.0305*** 
 (0.0120)  (0.0118)  (0.00870)  (0.0111) 
Black  0.0342***  -0.0159  0.0279***  -0.0724*** 
 (0.0125)  (0.0121)  (0.00858)  (0.0111) 
Currently married -0.0168**  -0.00664  -0.00400  -0.00494 
 (0.00811)  (0.00795)  (0.00558)  (0.00774) 
College  -0.0603***  -0.0308***  -0.0300***  0.0836*** 
 (0.0102)  (0.00971)  (0.00678)  (0.00763) 
Teen health status  -0.0578***  -0.0389**  -0.0131  0.0229 
 (0.0157)  (0.0152)  (0.0107)  (0.0148) 
Household health status  0.0191***  0.00653  0.00966**  0.00143 
 (0.00666)  (0.00653)  (0.00463)  (0.00631) 
TDAP booster update 0.114***  0.0662***  0.0300***  0.118*** 
 (0.0114)  (0.0107)  (0.00708)  (0.00673) 
School mandate  0.0336  0.0474  -0.0150  -0.0578 
 (0.0490)  (0.0485)  (0.0436)  (0.0489) 
Education for parents 0.0156  -0.00490  -0.0115  0.0274 
 (0.0225)  (0.0216)  (0.0168)  (0.0221) 
Physician 
recommendation 
0.736*** 
(0.0718) 
 0.651*** 
(0.0668) 
 0.360*** 
(0.0456) 
  
Excluded IVs        
Asthma        0.0350*** 
       (0.00765) 
Checkup 11-12       0.149*** 
       (0.0111) 
F-Statistics 103.23***  103.23***  103.23***   
Hansen J statistics 0.6613  0.7537  0.4840   
        
Observations 25,413  25,413  25,413  25,413 
Note: Regressions include state and year fixed effects as well as the interactions of age and year. The 
numbers in parenthesis are robust standard errors. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 2.6. Robustness Checks for Instrumental Variables 
 Vaccine Initiation  Vaccine Completion  Update before Age 13 
 IV-Probit Stage 1  IV-Probit Stage1  IV-Probit Stage 1 
VARIABLES (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6) 
Panel A- Using History of Asthma as Only Instrument 
School mandate 0.137 -0.156  0.141 -0.156  0.104 -0.156 
 (0.106) (0.106)  (0.113) (0.106)  (0.120) (0.106) 
Education for parents 0.0532 0.0123  0.00430 0.0136  -0.0616 0.0158 
 (0.0541) (0.0535)  (0.0578) (0.0537)  (0.0797) (0.0538) 
Physician 
recommendation  
1.525*** 
(0.158) 
  1.032*** 
(0.179) 
  0.968*** 
(0.194) 
 
         
Excluded IV         
Asthma   0.116***   0.112***   0.112*** 
  (0.0191)   (0.0200)   (0.0202) 
ρ   -0.489***   -0.241*   -0.256* 
  (0.148)   (0.124)   (0.135) 
F-Statistics  36.59***   31.19***   30.59*** 
Constant -2.004*** -0.327   -0.340  9.918*** -0.341 
 (0.222) (0.217)   (0.218)  (1.013) (0.218) 
Observations 30,376 30,376  30,376 30,376  30,376 30,376 
Panel B- Using History of Asthma and Missing School as Instrumental Variables 
School mandate 0.0993 -0.152  0.126 -0.153  0.0871 -0.152 
 (0.109) (0.106)  (0.113) (0.106)  (0.121) (0.106) 
Education for parents 0.0610 0.0155  0.00604 0.0149  -0.0610 0.0155 
 (0.0559) (0.0539)  (0.0585) (0.0539)  (0.0808) (0.0539) 
Physician 
recommendation 
0.847*** 
(0.225) 
  0.769*** 
(0.159) 
  0.674*** 
(0.153) 
 
         
Excluded IVs         
Asthma  0.110***   0.112***   0.111*** 
  (0.0217)   (0.0205)   (0.0204) 
Missing school more 
than 30 days 
 -0.113* 
(0.0652) 
  -0.117* 
(0.0656) 
  -0.115* 
(0.0652) 
         
ρ   -1.47e-05   -0.0683   -0.0634 
  (0.138)   (0.0997)   (0.0954) 
         
F-Statistics  13.76***   15.82***   15.90*** 
Constant -1.842*** -0.361*  -2.182*** -0.357  10.22*** -0.358 
 (0.244) (0.219)  (0.255) (0.219)  (1.030) (0.219) 
Observations 30,376 30,376  30,376 30,376  30,376 30,376 
Panel C- Marginal Effects 
 Asthma Missing 
School 
 Asthma Missing 
School 
 Asthma Missing 
School 
School Mandate 0.0546 0.0395  0.0492 0.0436  0.0132 0.0104 
 (0.0422) (0.0435)  (0.0409) (0.0405)  (0.0165) (0.0155) 
Education for Parents 0.0212 0.0242  0.00145 0.00203  -0.00699 -0.00661 
 (0.0215) (0.0223)  (0.0195) (0.0197)  (0.00876) (0.00847) 
Physician 
Recommendation 
0.542*** 
(0.0457) 
0.323*** 
(0.0799) 
 0.322*** 
(0.0521) 
0.245*** 
(0.0474) 
 0.106*** 
(0.0259) 
0.0709*** 
(0.0165) 
         
Note: Regressions include state and year fixed effects as well as the interactions of age and year. The 
numbers in parenthesis are robust standard errors. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 2.7. Robustness Checks for Multi-colinearity and Statistical Power 
 Vaccine Initiation  Vaccine Completion  Update Before Age 13 
VARIABLES (1)  (2)  (3) 
Panel A-Robustness Check for Multi-colinearity 
School mandates 0.0186  0.0272  0.00959 
 (0.0418)  (0.0390)  (0.0152) 
Education for parents 0.0240  0.00468  -0.00656 
 (0.0217)  (0.0198)  (0.00846) 
      
Observations 30,557  30,557  30,376 
Panel B- Consider School Mandates as Educational Program 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Education for Parents 0.0232  0.00791  -0.00439 
 (0.0207)  (0.0190)  (0.00867) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Observations 39,557  30,557  30,557 
Note: Regressions include state and year fixed effects as well as the interactions of age and year. The numbers in 
parenthesis are robust standard errors. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
Table 2.8. Regression with Control Group of States that Introduced School Mandates 
 Vaccine Initiation  Vaccine Completion  Update before Age 13 
VARIABLES (1)  (2)  (3) 
      
School mandate 0.0598  0.0412  0.00712 
 (0.0439)  (0.0412)  (0.0176) 
Education for parents 0.0873***  0.0376  -0.00736 
 (0.0322)  (0.0303)  (0.0143) 
      
Observations 15,685  15,685  15,685 
Note: Regressions include state and year fixed effects as well as the interactions of age and year. The numbers in 
parenthesis are robust standard errors. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 2.9. Vaccination Rate Predictor Means 
Variable Virginia Synthetic Virginia 
Median income 66101.65 66177.69 
Unemployment rate 4 4.2619 
Percentage of urban population 0.714353 0.8202806 
Population density 183.1326 289.125 
Percentage of Hispanic 0.0734881 0.0820556 
Percentage of Blacks 0.197647 0.1945446 
Prevalence of Chlamydia 2078.9 2004.011 
Percentage of female population above age 25 with a 
bachelor’s degree or higher 0.329 0.31486 
Percentage of population under age 18 with public 
health insurance plans 0.1928294 0.2089898 
Percentage of married households 0.512861 0.5132828 
 
 
Table 2.10.  State Weights in Synthetic Virginia 
State Weight State Weight 
Alabama 0 Montana 0 
Alaska 0.07 Nebraska 0 
Arizona 0 New Hampshire 0 
Arkansas 0 New Jersey 0 
California 0 New York 0 
Connecticut 0 North Carolina 0 
Delaware 0 North Dakota 0.048 
Florida 0 Ohio 0 
Georgia 0 Oklahoma 0 
Hawaii 0.015 Pennsylvania 0 
Idaho 0 Rhode Island 0 
Indiana 0 South Carolina 0.035 
Kansas 0 South Dakota 0 
Kentucky 0 Tennessee 0 
Maine 0 Texas 0 
Maryland 0.599 Utah 0.234 
Massachusetts 0 Vermont 0 
Michigan 0 Washington 0 
Minnesota  0 West Virginia 0 
Mississippi 0 Wisconsin 0 
Missouri 0 Wyoming 0 
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Table 2.11. Synthetic Control Method 
Panel A- Probit 
 Vaccine Initiation   Vaccine Completion  Update Before Age 13 
VARIABLES (1)  (2)  (3) 
      
School mandate 0.0207  0.0202  -0.0117 
 (0.0667)  (0.0609)  (0.0134) 
      
Observations 4,092  4,092  3,919 
Panel B- Linear Probability Model 
      
School mandate 0.0218  0.0230  -0.0265 
 (0.0741)  (0.0683)  (0.0508) 
      
Constant 0.807  0.494  1.156** 
 (0.739)  (0.681)  (0.507) 
Observations 1,256  1,256  1,256 
R-squared 0.088  0.069  0.128 
Note: Regressions include state and year fixed effects as well as the interactions of age and year. The 
numbers in parenthesis are standard errors. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
Table 2.12. Difference-in-Difference-in-Difference 
 Vaccine Initiation  Vaccine Completion  Update Before Age 13 
VARIABLES (1)  (2)  (3) 
      
Schman*treat*after 0.0939  0.0514  0.0138 
 (0.0694)  (0.0671)  (0.0392) 
Treatment*after -0.0543  -0.0678  -0.0366 
 (0.0513)  (0.0423)  (0.0276) 
Schman*after -0.0715***  -0.0654***  -0.0801*** 
 (0.0130)  (0.0112)  (0.00417) 
Schman*treatment -0.0973**  -0.0166  -0.0362 
 (0.0478)  (0.0443)  (0.0223) 
Schman  -0.0976***  -0.0850***  0.231*** 
 (0.00903)  (0.00818)  (0.00690) 
      
Observations 23,219  23,219  23,219 
Note: Regressions include state and year fixed effects. The numbers in parenthesis are robust 
standard errors. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Chapter 3: Immunization and Moral Hazard: The Effect of Human 
Papillomavirus Vaccination on Participation in Routine Pap Test 
 
3.1. Introduction  
Cervical cancer is the second most common cancer related cause of death among 
women globally. Virtually all cervical cancers are causally related to infection by Human 
Papillomavirus (HPV). Approximately 70% of cervical cancers are caused by HPV types 
16 and 18 (Saslow et al., 2007). Cervical cancer is the easiest gynecological cancer to 
prevent, and it only requires regular screening tests and follow-ups. There are two tests 
for diagnosing cervical cancer, the Pap test (or Pap smear), which looks for cell change in 
the cervix that might ultimately become cervical cancer if it is not treated appropriately, 
and the HPV test, which looks for the virus (HPV) that can cause these cell changes. The 
Pap test is recommended for all women between ages 21 and 65 years old, and the HPV 
test is recommended for women older than 30 years old along with the Pap test (Center 
for Disease Control and Prevention, 2014).   
The Pap test is one of the most effective and successful cancer screenings in 
history. Most women diagnosed with cervical cancer have either never had a Pap test, or 
have not had it in the past 5 years (Center for Disease Control and Prevention, 2012). 
Participation in regular Pap tests has decreased the incidence and mortality rates of 
cervical cancer in the past 40 years causing cervical cancer to not be the leading cause of 
cancer death for women in the United States anymore (Center for Disease Control and 
Prevention, 2013). U.S. cervical cancer incidence rates decreased by 75% and mortality 
by 74% in the 50 years following the introduction of cervical cytology in 1949 (Howe et 
al., 2007). The most successful strategy in cervical cancer prevention is population-based 
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Pap-smear screening programs. The introduction of screening programs in unscreened 
populations can result in 60-90 % reduction in cervical cancer rates within 3 years after 
implementation (Saslow et al., 2002).   
Recently, some progress has been made in preventive strategies for cervical 
cancers. Two vaccines were developed that can provide immunization against certain 
types of HPV. The bivalent vaccine (Cervarix) and quadrivalent vaccine (Gardasil) can 
protect against HPV types 16 and 18. Gardasil also protects against HPV types 6 and 11, 
which cause 90% of genital warts. The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approved 
Gardasil in 2006 and Cervarix in 2009. The Advisory Committee on Immunization 
Practices (ACIP) recommends either HPV vaccine for routine immunization for girls 11 
to 12 years old and catch-up vaccination for adolescents and adults 13 to 26 years old 
who have not been vaccinated previously. ACIP also recommends the quadrivalent 
vaccine for 11 to 12 years old boys (Center for Disease Control and Prevention, 2010). 
ACIP recommended the vaccine in 2006, but the recommendation was published in 
March 2007 (Robin et al., 2014). Despite impressive efficiency records of the vaccines, 
regular Pap tests are recommended for women who have been sexually active even after 
the HPV vaccine. First of all, vaccination will not protect against all HPV types not 
included in the first generation of the vaccines. About 30% of cervical cancers will not be 
prevented by the HPV vaccines. Moreover, women who got the vaccine after becoming 
sexually active might not get the full benefit of the vaccine if they already had been 
exposed to HPV. These factors, along with the fact that long term effects of the vaccine 
are unknown at the time being, will promote using both prevention strategies as 
complements (Franco et al., 2006).  
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In this study, I look at the behavioral response to the HPV vaccine. Medical 
innovations, can result in moral hazard by reducing the cost of unhealthy behaviors. For 
example, obesity has increased as a result of great improvement in heart disease 
treatments (Peltzman 2011). Low cost medical treatment for diabetes can increase the 
body mass index (Klick & Stratman, 2007). HPV vaccination can also cause moral 
hazard in low income adolescents as they are more likely to get involved in risky sexual 
behaviors in response to taking the HPV vaccine compared to those who have not 
initiated the vaccine (Hall, 2014).  
I specifically look into the effect of vaccination on the decision to participate in 
Pap tests. The empirical evidence presented by Ferris et al. (2012) shows that women are 
more receptive to getting the HPV vaccine in exchange for longer Pap test intervals, and 
Pap test non-compliers are more likely to get the HPV vaccine if Pap test was required 
less frequently. If vaccination results in reduction in participation in Pap tests, this could 
potentially increase the prevalence of cervical cancer. This should be of interest to public 
health policy makers.  The decision to initiate the vaccine and the decision to participate 
in Pap tests are being determined simultaneously. There might be some unobserved 
factors that derive both decisions which raise endogeneity issues and will likely lead to 
biased estimates. To deal with this issue, I use the fact that the HPV vaccination is 
recommended for women younger than age 26 years old, and the probability of 
vaccination should change significantly at this age. I use this cut-off point at 
recommended age to construct a fuzzy regression discontinuity to identify more clearly 
the effect of the HPV vaccine on testing.             
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The results indicate that vaccine initiation is positively associated with short- and 
long- term probability of participation in Pap tests even after controlling for potential 
endogeneity. This might be the result of increased awareness that people acquire at the 
time of vaccination. The results support the argument that the vaccine initiation indicator 
should be treated as an endogenous regressor. The estimates that ignore the potential 
endogeneity will result in under-estimating the true effect of the vaccine initiation on the 
decision to participate in Pap tests. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: in the second section, I describe the 
data and methodology, the third section presents the results, fourth section analyses the 
sensitivity of the results to different specifications, and the fifth section concludes. 
 
3.2. Data and Methodology  
I use the National Health Interview Survey (NHIS) for this study. The NHIS is a 
cross-sectional household interview designed to collect information for monitoring the 
health of the United States population. The core of the database contains four major 
components: Household, Family, Sample Adult, and Sample Child. The Household 
component collects limited demographic information on all the individuals living in a 
particular house. The Family component verifies and collects additional demographic 
information on each member from each family in the household and also collects 
information on health status, illness and injuries, and access to healthcare and utilization. 
From each family in the NHIS, one sample adult and one sample child are randomly 
selected and detailed health related information on each is collected. The Sample Adult 
component of the NHIS contains information on Pap test screening history and HPV 
vaccination. I use the Sample Adult database and use other components to match 
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socioeconomic information for each individual in the sample to construct my database. 
The final sample consists of information from years 2008-2012, except for the year 2009, 
in which information about vaccination and Pap tests is missing.  
To estimate the effect of HPV vaccination on the decision to participate in Pap 
tests, I begin by estimating: 
 
1 2( ( ) )ijt ijt j t ijt ijtY f X hpvinitα β γ δ β ε= + + + + +          (1) 
 
I estimate this equation using a probit model. Yijt either represents whether a 
person had a Pap test in the past 12 months (hereafter referred to as a short-run Pap test) 
or whether a person has ever had a Pap test (hereafter referred to as long-run Pap test). 
The variable hpvinit is a dummy variable which is equal to one when a respondent has 
initiated the sequence of HPV vaccination (dose≥1) in the past and zero otherwise. γj is a 
vector of region dummy variable that captures time-invariant factors that cause the 
outcomes to be different between regions17. δt is a vector of year dummies that captures 
the variation in outcomes in different years that are common among regions. Xijt is a 
vector of control covariates. It includes control for age, race, marital status, employment 
status, health insurance coverage status, citizenship status, whether a person has visited a 
gynecologist in the past year, and whether a person has ever taken an HIV test. Table 3.1 
presents the definition and coding of each variable. 
                                                          
17
 It includes dummies for West, Midwest, Northeast, and South census regions. 
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It is important to point out that the decision to initiate the vaccine might be 
correlated with some unobserved factors that can influence the decision to participate in 
Pap tests simultaneously. Failing to control for the interdependence between these two 
decisions will lead to biased and inconsistent estimates. The direction of the bias is 
unclear. For example, people placing a higher value on health might seek both preventive 
options and treat them as complements. On the other hand, it is possible that people with 
limited access to regular healthcare might find the vaccination a more convenient method 
of protection that involves less attention and follow ups.  
A plausible strategy to identify exogenous variation in vaccine initiation is to 
exploit the knowledge of the rules determining the treatment (HPV vaccine initiation in 
this case). There is an opportunity to construct a regression discontinuity design when 
there is a known cut-off point in treatment assignment or the probability of treatment 
receipt as a function of one or more continuous assignment variables. In principle, 
regression discontinuity compares the average outcome for units just left and right of the 
discontinuity point within a very small interval around the cut-off point. Increasing the 
interval around the cut-off point might result in biased estimates of the treatment, 
specifically when the assignment variable is related to the outcome conditional on 
treatment assignment (van der Klaauw, 2008). CDC recommends the vaccine for women 
younger than 26 years old (Center for Disease control and Prevention, 2014). Therefore, 
one might expect the probability of vaccination to be discontinuous at this cut-off point. I 
use this cut-off point to construct a fuzzy regression discontinuity (RD) around this point. 
In fuzzy design, treatment assignment depends on x in a stochastic manner, but one in 
which the propensity of treatment (Pr (T=1|x)) is again known to have a discontinuity at 
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x (van der Klaauw, 2008). I use the discontinuity as an instrumental variable for 
treatment status. This new estimate can be summarized by: 
 
1 2
1 2
1( ( ) 0)
1( (T ) 0)
ijt ijt j t ijt ijt
ijt ijt j t it ijt
Y X hpvinit
hpvinit X u
α β γ δ β ε
α ϕ γ δ ϕ
= + + + + + ≥
= + + + + + ≥
          (2) 
0 1| ,
0 1
Z N
u
ε ρ
ρ
      
      
      
∼  
 
T is a dummy variable which is equal to one when the individual is in the 
recommended age range at any given year. I adjust the cut-off points in each year by 
considering the fact that people might not be in the recommended age group in that year, 
but they have been within that age range sometime in the past. For example, a 27 year old 
woman is not in the recommended age group in 2008, however, she was 26 years old in 
2007, and therefore, she was in the recommended age group in that year. As a result, I 
consider the age of 27 as a cut-off point in 2008, and I adjust the cut-off points in the 
years after accordingly. Figure 3.1 shows the discontinuity in treatment at different cut-
off points. Z is the vector of instrumental and exogenous variable. ρ captures the 
correlation between disturbances in these two equations, and it indicates endogeneity 
when it is different from zero.  I restrict the sample to an interval of 4 years before and 
after the cut-off point in order to have a small interval around the cut-off point with a 
sufficiently large number of observations. I will eventually narrow down the interval 
around the cut-off point for robustness checks. 
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3.3. Results 
Table 3.2 presents the results from the baseline regression (equation 1) as well as 
RD design. The first column in each set of regressions presents the results from the probit 
model without taking potential endogeneity into account. The next two columns present 
the results from regression discontinuity framework along with the results from the first 
stage. Table 3.3 presents the marginal effects of the HPV vaccine initiation on the Pap 
test participation decision in different specifications. 
Most variables have the expected signs and the trends are very similar for both 
dependent variables. However, estimated coefficients are more precisely estimated for the 
short-run Pap test. It is worth mentioning that information about the long-run Pap test is 
not available after 2010. Fewer numbers of observations can obviously cause a loss in 
efficiency. This issue becomes even more pronounced for estimating the first stage in RD 
design when the outcome of interest is the long-run Pap test due to the fact that there is 
not much variation in HPV vaccine initiation over this time period perhaps reflecting the 
short span of time after approval of the vaccine.  
The HPV vaccine initiation increases the probability of having a Pap test in the 
short- and long- run. I find a negative bias in those estimates that ignore the endogeneity. 
Initiating the vaccine can increase the probability of having a Pap test by 18% in the 
short-run and by 5% in the long-run. This positive association might be derived from an 
increased awareness of the existence of the test happening during the vaccination time. 
Note that ρ captures the potential correlation between unobservables that determines 
vaccine initiation and having a Pap test simultaneously. ρ is negative and significant in all 
the specifications that account for endogeneity. This is consistent with finding negative 
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bias in those specifications that ignore endogeneity. It also supports my contention that 
vaccine initiation should be considered as a potentially endogenous regressor.  
The instrumental variable also has the expected sign indicating that being in the 
recommended age group will increase the probability of vaccine initiation, however, it is 
not statistically significant at the conventional level when the outcome of interest is the 
long-run Pap test. Again, there is not much variation in HPV vaccine initiation over the 
time period in which the data for the long-run Pap test exists. However, the point estimate 
for the instrumental variable remains positive in this specification. I also report the F-
statistics for the excluded IV from the first stage in order to provide a measure to test for 
weak identification. The estimated F-statistics cannot rule out the possibility of weak 
identification. Consistent with the previous findings, the F-statistics is much weaker for 
the long-run Pap test. Poor F-statistics from the first stage mainly resulted from two 
reasons. First, as previously mentioned, the potential identifying variation in the HPV 
vaccine initiation is limited to the first two years in the data. This affects the precision of 
estimated coefficients, as well as the F-statistics. Second, the RD design requires working 
within a small interval around the cut-off point. This obviously comes with the cost of a 
loss in efficiency and a decrease in the F-statistic. 
The results in Table 3.2 also indicate that respondent’s age is positively associated 
with the probability of having a Pap test and is negatively associated with the probability 
of initiating the HPV vaccine. The HPV vaccination is recommended only for women 
younger than 26 years old, whereas the Pap test is recommended until age of 65 years 
old, and the need for the Pap test is expected to increase with age. Visiting a gynecologist 
in the past 12 months is a strong predictor of having a Pap test in the short-run and long-
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run. Such a strong relationship can be derived from reverse causality that people who 
intend to have a Pap test will visit a gynecologist. However, inclusion of this variable, 
along with other variables like health insurance status and income, can control for access 
to healthcare. An HIV test is also positively correlated with both having a Pap test and 
initiating the HPV vaccine in all the specifications. If an individual needs to be tested for 
a sexually transmitted disease, it is more likely for that person to take precautionary 
measures for other STDs. The estimated coefficients for pregnancy status are not 
statistically significant on the short-run Pap test, however, the point estimates are positive 
for having a Pap test and is negative for vaccine initiation. It is worth mentioning that the 
HPV vaccine is not recommended for pregnant women while the Pap test is 
recommended for them. The same pattern does not hold for the long-run Pap test. This 
might result from the fact that pregnant women are relatively younger and less likely to 
have a Pap test in the past.  
A reasonable alternative for the instrumental variable probit model is 2SLS. 
However, I suspect that the conditional expectation function associated with the first 
stage is non-linear. My approach is to use the fitted value of the first stage as the 
instrumental variable (Wooldridge, 2011). The results are firmly consistent with the 
findings from the IV-Probit model. Vaccine initiation is still positively influencing the 
decision to have a Pap test. The F-statistics for the excluded IV is also larger than that 
from the IV probit model. However, this is an expected change considering the fact that 
the excluded IV is the fitted value from the original first stage estimation.18 
                                                          
18
 If I use the discontinuity function (t) instead of fitted value as an instrumental variable, the estimated 
coefficients for HPV vaccine initiation becomes negative, small, and statistically insignificant. These 
results will be available upon request.  
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Altogether, I cannot conclude from the results that moral hazard exists. Although 
I have a limited numbers of observations, the point estimates for the instrumental variable 
have the expected sign. While the share of people who have initiated the vaccine is 
steadily growing over time, one might expect that inclusion of observations from the 
most recent years, which are going to be released in the future, can improve the F-test19. 
It is important to point out that regression discontinuity results at best can be 
interpreted as average treatment effect for a sub-population near the cut-off point. Fuzzy 
regression discontinuity restricts the sub-population even further to that of compliers at 
this value of the covariate. Generalizing the results as population average treatment effect 
requires strong assumptions justifying extrapolation to other sub-populations (Imbens and 
Wooldridge, 2007).  
 
3.4. Sensitivity Analysis  
It is important to investigate how sensitive the parametric estimates are to 
alternative and more flexible specifications. First, I add different combinations of 
polynomial orders to the Pap test and the HPV vaccine initiation equations (van der 
Klaauw, 2008). Panel A of Table 3.5 presents the results of these new estimates. I restrict 
the outcome only to the short-run Pap test for which I have a sufficiently large number of 
observations to efficiently estimate the coefficients. I report the estimates of the HPV 
vaccine initiation from the IV-probit framework, as well as the coefficients of the 
instrumental variable, and the correlation parameter ρ. The results are firmly consistent 
                                                          
19
 Restricting the sample to only years 2011 and 2012 that relatively higher share of people initiated the 
vaccine in them, and increasing the interval around the cut-off point increases the F-test. These results will 
be available upon request. 
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with the previous findings indicating that the HPV vaccine initiation will increase the 
probability of the short-run Pap test. Additionally, neglecting the potential endogeneity 
will cause negative bias in the estimated effect of the HPV vaccine initiation on the short-
run Pap test.  
I also use the interaction term of age and discontinuity function (T) as a new 
instrumental variable for the treatment status (Angrist & Pischke, 2009). Moreover, I 
increasingly narrow the window around the cut-off point. A smaller interval around the 
cut-off point will decrease the risk of misspecification bias, but it obviously comes with a 
loss in efficiency. Panel B of Table 3.5 presents the results from these two class of 
robustness checks. Adding an interaction term does not change the results. Vaccine 
initiation remains a positive predictor of the short-run Pap test. Taking increasingly 
narrower windows around the cut-off point does not change the sign of the estimated 
coefficient of the HPV vaccine initiation. The estimated coefficients remain positive in 
all the specifications. However, the coefficients are not statistically significant for four 
and two year intervals around the cut-off point. This is perhaps reflecting fewer numbers 
of observations in smaller intervals. Correlation coefficients are negative in six and four 
year’s intervals but become insignificant when the interval around the cut-off point is 
four years. The coefficient becomes positive and statistically insignificant when the 
interval is restricted to two years.20 The results from the sensitivity analysis, consistent 
with the previous findings, do not provide any evidence of moral hazard. Although some 
estimates of the HPV vaccine initiation is not statistically significant, the point estimates 
remain positive even in more conservative specifications.  
                                                          
20
 The results are qualitatively the same after inclusion of higher order age polynomials, these results will 
be available upon request.   
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3.5. Conclusion 
In this study, I look at the behavioral response to HPV vaccination. Vaccination 
can influence the risk perception of those who took the vaccine and cause moral hazard. I 
specifically look at the effect of HPV vaccination on participation in Pap test. Although 
HPV vaccination can protect against certain types of HPV and prevent cervical cancer, 
the protection is not complete and the vaccination should not be considered as a perfect 
substitute for Pap test.  
I use the cut-off point in the recommended age for the vaccination to construct a 
fuzzy regression discontinuity. The results provide no evidence of moral hazard. HPV 
vaccination is found to be positively associated with the short-run Pap test, however, 
estimated coefficients are not statistically significant in some of the specifications. This is 
mainly derived from lack of variation in HPV vaccine initiation indicator, and as a result, 
lack of statistical power. The results are not conclusive about the effect of HPV 
vaccination on long-run Pap test. This likely  is due to the fact that the data waves in 
which information about long-run Pap test exists is limited to two years, and share of 
people who initiated the vaccine over this time is very limited.  
This study’s limitations with regard to statistical power should be overcome with 
additional years of data. Regression discontinuity design requires limiting the sample to a 
small interval around the cut-off point that reinforces this problem. Adding more data 
points, potentially from future waves of NHIS can resolve this problem as well 
considering the fact that greater shares of the public are initiating the vaccine each year 
(Center for Disease Control and Prevention, 2012 & 2014). 
Regression discontinuity designs also come with additional unique disadvantages. 
As previously mentioned, the results from regression discontinuity designs can be 
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interpreted as average treatment effect for a sub-population. In addition to the 
aforementioned theoretical shortcoming, the database I use provides little variation in the 
endogenous regressor. Lack of variation becomes even more pronounced considering the 
fact that RD designs require restricting the sample to a small interval around the cut-off 
point. One avenue for future research is to pursue alternative methods that do not suffer 
from the limitations presented by the regression discontinuity approach.  One possibility 
is a  modified control function approach, which exploits the dependence of the error on 
the exogenous variables (heteroscedasticity) to adjust the conventional control function 
approach (Klein & Vella, 2010; Farre, et al., 2008). This might be the next step in this 
study to estimate the effect of HPV vaccine initiation on the short-run and long-run Pap 
test. 
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Table 3.1. Definition of Control Variables 
Variable Coding 
Age =Respondent’s age 
Race/Ethnicity  
Hispanic =1 if the person is Hispanic 
Black =1 if the person is Black 
Marital status =1 if the person is currently married 
Insurance =1 if  the person holds any kind of health insurance plan 
Employment  =1 if the person worked for pay anytime in the last year 
Citizen =1 if the person is American citizen 
Health status =1 if the reported health status is greater than 3 in a 1-5 scale 
Gynecological visit =1 if the person visited a gynecologist in the last year 
HIV test =1 if person has ever been tested for HIV 
Pregnant =1 if the person is currently pregnant 
Income  =1 if household’s income is above 35,000$ 
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Figure 3.1.  Discontinuity of HPV vaccine initiation propensity at the cut-off points 
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Table 3.2.  Regression Discontinuity Results 
 Pap test in the last year  Had Pap test in the past 
 Probit IV-Probit Stage 1  Probit IV-Probit Stage 1 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
        
Age 0.0142* 0.0267*** -0.125***  0.0705*** 0.0989*** -0.167*** 
 (0.00841) (0.0103) (0.0221)  (0.0210) (0.0206) (0.0426) 
Insurance 0.385*** 0.367*** 0.209***  0.0281 -0.0289 0.367*** 
 (0.0442) (0.0453) (0.0666)  (0.102) (0.0979) (0.128) 
Hispanic 0.171*** 0.181*** -0.201***  0.0755 0.109 -0.318*** 
 (0.0512) (0.0511) (0.0692)  (0.122) (0.112) (0.122) 
Black 0.282*** 0.289*** -0.135*  0.0140 0.0638 -0.252** 
 (0.0572) (0.0569) (0.0687)  (0.128) (0.119) (0.122) 
Currently married -0.0796* -0.0540 -0.349***  0.0824 0.144 -0.416*** 
 (0.0429) (0.0447) (0.0561)  (0.103) (0.0998) (0.103) 
Employment 0.127*** 0.119** 0.107*  0.0475 0.0210 0.124 
 (0.0471) (0.0468) (0.0641)  (0.103) (0.0976) (0.117) 
Citizen 0.157*** 0.148** 0.221**  0.935*** 0.857*** 0.0152 
 (0.0583) (0.0579) (0.0947)  (0.120) (0.120) (0.146) 
Health status 0.124* 0.125* 0.0122  -0.214 -0.209 0.00199 
 (0.0705) (0.0705) (0.0953)  (0.167) (0.158) (0.166) 
Gynecologist visit 1.554*** 1.523*** 0.0970*  0.871*** 0.754*** 0.149 
 (0.0410) (0.0478) (0.0525)  (0.105) (0.111) (0.0975) 
HIV test 0.176*** 0.149*** 0.365***  0.722*** 0.610*** 0.253** 
 (0.0393) (0.0416) (0.0550)  (0.0903) (0.0983) (0.104) 
Pregnant 0.0600 0.0693 -0.0867  -0.367* -0.271 -0.177 
 (0.0899) (0.0887) (0.0991)  (0.195) (0.187) (0.205) 
Income 0.0565 0.0423 0.168***  0.206** 0.170* 0.0981 
 (0.0438) (0.0438) (0.0547)  (0.0929) (0.0907) (0.0920) 
HPV vaccine initiation 0.358*** 1.003***   0.420* 1.649***  
 (0.0870) (0.310)   (0.238) (0.288)  
        
Excluded IV        
 
       
t   0.233**    0.0897 
   (0.0965)    (0.183) 
ρ  
 -0.355**    -0.890***  
  (0.180)    (0.324)  
        
F-test  5.83**    0.24  
        
Constant -1.615*** -2.024*** 1.722**  -1.960*** -2.834*** 2.942** 
 (0.288) (0.343) (0.736)  (0.660) (0.633) (1.310) 
        
Observations 7,056 7,586 7,586  2,546 2,557 2,557 
Note: Regressions include region and year fixed effects. The numbers in parenthesis are robust standard 
errors. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 3.3.  Marginal effects 
 Pap test in the last year  Had Pap test in the past 
 Probit IV-Probit  Probit IV-Probit 
VARIABLES (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
      
HPV vaccine initiation 0.0879*** 0.189***  0.0204** 0.0500*** 
 (0.0181) (0.0339)  (0.00816) (0.0109) 
      
Observations 7,056 7,586  2,546 2,557 
Note: Regressions include region and year fixed effects. The numbers in parenthesis are robust 
standard errors. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 3.4.  Linear Probability Model 
 Pap test in the last year  Pap test in the past 
 OLS 2SLS Stage1  OLS 2SLS Stage 1 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
        
Age 0.00299 0.00585* 0.00202  0.00766*** 0.00960*** 0.00453 
 (0.00196) (0.00347) (0.00231)  (0.00226) (0.00372) (0.00364) 
Insurance 0.108*** 0.105*** -0.00433  0.00186 -0.00101 -0.0100 
 (0.0122) (0.0125) (0.00690)  (0.0143) (0.0148) (0.0102) 
Hispanic 0.0427*** 0.0457*** 0.00198  0.0113 0.0140 0.00959 
 (0.0120) (0.0125) (0.00776)  (0.0149) (0.0152) (0.0124) 
Black 0.0673*** 0.0698*** 0.00335  0.00143 0.00445 0.00644 
 (0.0120) (0.0124) (0.00840)  (0.0125) (0.0134) (0.0123) 
Currently married -0.0164* -0.0109 0.00662  0.0148 0.0188 0.0133 
 (0.00997) (0.0115) (0.00688)  (0.0107) (0.0127) (0.0113) 
Employment  0.0261** 0.0248** -0.00191  0.00158 0.000436 -0.000988 
 (0.0119) (0.0120) (0.00655)  (0.0132) (0.0133) (0.00923) 
Citizen  0.0440*** 0.0414*** 0.00333  0.156*** 0.156*** 0.00545 
 (0.0153) (0.0155) (0.00786)  (0.0224) (0.0223) (0.0116) 
Health status 0.0259 0.0264 -0.00166  -0.0239 -0.0239 -0.00368 
 (0.0183) (0.0184) (0.0106)  (0.0162) (0.0162) (0.0157) 
Gynecologist visit 0.447*** 0.446*** -0.00319  0.0921*** 0.0905*** -0.00265 
 (0.0105) (0.0105) (0.00631)  (0.0104) (0.0104) (0.00974) 
HIV test 0.0448*** 0.0393*** -0.00924  0.0964*** 0.0937*** -0.00766 
 (0.00985) (0.0113) (0.00654)  (0.0128) (0.0134) (0.0104) 
Pregnant  0.0162 0.0183 -0.00202  -0.0249 -0.0226 -0.000330 
 (0.0148) (0.0150) (0.0114)  (0.0185) (0.0190) (0.0171) 
Income  0.0168 0.0137 -0.00148  0.0236** 0.0226** -0.00348 
 (0.0103) (0.0107) (0.00680)  (0.0108) (0.0109) (0.00979) 
HPV vaccine initiation  0.0751*** 0.221*   0.0310** 0.134  
 (0.0164) (0.134)   (0.0148) (0.121)  
Excluded IV        
        
Fitted value   1.167***    1.316*** 
   (0.137)    (0.233) 
        
F-test  72.81***    31.83***  
        
Constant 0.0936 -0.00272 -0.0711  0.456*** 0.394*** -0.156 
 (0.0674) (0.117) (0.0795)  (0.0757) (0.121) (0.120) 
        
Observations 7,056 7,056 7,056  2,546 2,546 2,546 
Note: Regressions include region and year fixed effects. The numbers in parenthesis are robust standard errors. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 3.5. Robustness Check 
Panel A- Higher Polynomial Orders 
 Polynomial terms in Pap test equation 
Linear Quadratic Cubic 
Po
ly
n
o
m
ia
l t
er
m
s 
in
 
H
PV
 
v
ac
ci
n
e 
in
iti
at
io
n
 
 
 
eq
u
at
io
n
 
Linear 
Vaccine initiation 
1.003*** 
(0.310) 
0.983*** 
(0.316) 
0.985*** 
(0.3168) 
t 
0.233** 
(0.0965) 
0.236** 
(0.0964) 
0.236** 
(0.0964) 
ρ  -0.355** (0.180) 
-0.344* 
(0.1818) 
-0.346* 
(0.1825) 
Quadratic 
Vaccine initiation 
1.049*** 
(0.3063) 
1.009*** 
(0.3196) 
1.011*** 
(0.3202) 
t 
0.283** 
(0.103) 
0.284*** 
(0.103) 
0.284*** 
(0.103) 
ρ  -0.385** (0.1832) 
-0.361* 
(0.1874) 
-0.362* 
(0.1878) 
Cubic 
Vaccine initiation 
1.047*** 
(0.3057) 
1.007*** 
(0.3195) 
1.010*** 
(0.3203) 
t 
0.276*** 
(0.1964) 
0.277*** 
(0.1063) 
0.278*** 
(0.1063) 
ρ  -0.383** (0.1826) 
-0.359* 
(0.1870) 
-0.361* 
(0.1877) 
Observations  7586 7586 7586 
Panel B- Adding Interaction Term as an IV and Smaller Intervals 
 Interaction 6 years interval 4 years interval 2 years interval 
Vaccine Initiation 1.011*** (0.3098) 
1.069*** 
(0.3428) 
0.694 
(0.4599) 
0.132 
(0.5498) 
t 2.323** (1.1548) 
0.184 
(0.1188) 
0.193 
(0.1588) 
0.655*** 
(0.1753) 
Age*t -0.067* (0.0367)    
ρ  -0.361** (0.1815) 
-0.409** 
(0.2046) 
-0.220 
(0.2227) 
0.105 
(0.2038) 
     
F-Statistics 4.13** 2.40 1.48 14.24*** 
     
Observations 7586 5731 3923 1956 
Note: Regressions include region and year fixed effects. The numbers in parenthesis are robust 
standard errors. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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